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CONGRESSIONAL BAILOUT OF FLOW CONTROL:
SAVING THE BURNING BEAST
SIDNEY M. WOLFf
I. INTRODUCTIONO N May 16, 1994, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown,1
the United States Supreme Court struck down a flow control
ordinance of Clarkstown, New York for violating the Commerce
Clause.2 Rendering this decision, the Court resolved a split in fed-
t Director, Graduate Program in Regional Planning, University of Massachu-
setts at Amherst; B.G.S., University of Iowa; MA., Urban and Regional Planning,
University of Iowa; J.D., University of Iowa; Ph.D., University of Illinois. Mr. Wolf
was a panelist at the Villanova Environmental LawJournal Symposium, Solid Waste
in Interstate Commerce: Federa4 State and Local Roles. This Article develops and re-
fines many of the points set forth during Mr. Wolf's presentation. Any opinions
expressed herein are solely those of the author.
1. 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994).
2. Id. The Commerce Clause states that "Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce ... among the several States." U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
The clause provides an affirmative grant of authority to Congress to regulate com-
merce. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). The clause has also been
interpreted by the Supreme Court to limit, by negative implication, the power of
the states and their political subdivisions to affect interstate commerce. This
power has come to be known as the "dormant" Commerce Clause. In Gibbons,
Chief Justice Marshall declared that the Framers of the Constitution meant the
language to be an absolute grant of power to Congress that precluded any state
regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 210-11. Marshall noted that only Con-
gress could exercise the power to affect interstate commerce, otherwise it must "lie
dormant." Id. at 189. The dormant Commerce Clause is also sometimes referred
to as the "negative" Commerce Clause. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach,
486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988).
The dormant Commerce Clause limits state power to affect interstate com-
merce even when Congress has not acted to either authorize or prohibit state ac-
tion. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 220 (1984) (affirming Commerce Clause as "implied restraint upon state reg-
ulatory powers"); Norfolk S. Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 392 (3d Cir. 1987). On
the other hand, despite the dormant Commerce Clause, the states retain residual
police power to protect the health, safety, public welfare, and the environment for
their citizens. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203 (deeming "police power" as that used by
states to legislate for health, safety and welfare of its citizens and defining it as "that
immense mass of legislation, which embraces everything within . . . a state, not
surrendered to the general government"). See also Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc.,
447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) ("[T]he States retain authority under their general police
powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern,' even though interstate
commerce may be affected."); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977) ("[1]n the absence of conflicting legislation by
Congress, there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters
of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce
(263)
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eral and state courts3 on the issue of whether flow control discrimi-
nated against interstate trade in waste in a manner which violated
the Commerce Clause. 4 Following the line of its previous decisions
striking down state barriers to the interstate movement of waste, 5
the Court held that the New York ordinance impermissibly discrimi-
nated against interstate commerce in waste.6
or even, to some extent, regulate it.") (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 767 (1945)).
3. Several decisions have upheld flow control despite Commerce Clause chal-
lenges. SeeJ. Filiberto Sanitation, Inc. v. NewJersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 857
F.2d 913 (3d Cir. 1988); Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187 (6th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985); Harvey & Harvey, Inc. v. Delaware
Solid Waste Auth., 600 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Del. 1985); Town of Clarkstown v. C&A
Carbone, Inc., 587 N.Y.S.2d 681 (App. Div. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1677 (1994); In
re Fiorillo Bros. of NJ., Inc., 577 A.2d 1316 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), cert.
denied, 585 A.2d 371 (1990); In re Waste Disposal Agreement, 568 A.2d 547 (NJ.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990). On the other hand, several decisions have invalided
flow control as a violation of the Commerce Clause. See Waste Recycling, Inc. v.
Southeast Alabama Solid Waste Disposal Auth., 814 F. Supp. 1566 (M.D. Ala.
1993); Container Corp. of Carolina v. Mecklenburg County, No. 92 cv-154-MU,
(W.D.N.C. June 19, 1992); Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp.
641 (D. Minn. 1992), aff'd, 985 F.2d 1381 (8th Cir. 1993); Stephen D. DeVito, Jr.
Trucking, Inc. v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770 F. Supp. 775
(D.R.I. 1991), aff'd, 947 F.2d 1004 (1st Cir. 1991). Flow control has also been
attacked on antitrust and takings grounds. See Hybud, 654 F.2d at 1187 (anti-trust
and takings); Waste Management of the Desert, Inc. v. Palm Springs Recycling
Center, Inc., 869 P.2d 440 (1994) (rejecting flow control as takings).
4. The dormant Commerce Clause does not prohibit state and local regula-
tion simply because it discriminates against interstate trade. See Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (recognizing that state statute can discriminate against
interstate commerce "either on its face or in practical effect"); Minnesota v. Clover
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471 n.15 (1981) (recognizing state statute can
discriminate in either purpose or effect). A discriminatory state or local regulation
may prevail if it is not for the purpose of local economic protectionism, or if it is
justified by a legitimate local purpose which is warranted by a valid reason not
connected to economic protectionism, and cannot be fulfilled by reasonable non-
discriminatory alternatives. See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988)
("Protectionism [is the use of] regulatory measures designed to benefit in-state
economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors."); Lewis v. BT Inv. Man-
agers, 447 U.S. 27, 36 (1980) (stating that local governments "retain authority
under their general police powers to regulate matters of 'legitimate local concern,'
even though interstate commerce may be affected"); New Energy, 486 U.S. at 278
(suggesting that discriminatory statute may be invalidated if the legitimate local
purpose "cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory
alternatives").
5. Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992) (invalidat-
ing Alabama statute imposing additional disposal fee on out-of-state hazardous
waste disposed in private landfill); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan
Dep't of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353 (1992) (invalidating Michigan statute
barring private landfill operators from accepting waste that originates outside
county); City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating New
Jersey regulation prohibiting importation of solid waste to public and private
landfills).
6. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1679.
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"Flow control" is a term describing the legal authority of state
and local governments to designate where waste hauling and collec-
tion firms must take municipal solid waste for processing, treat-
ment, or disposal. "Flow control," however, is somewhat of a
misnomer; it might better be called "waste designation." This is be-
cause flow control starts with a local ordinance or by-law directing
waste haulers in a jurisdiction to deliver their waste exclusively to
the designated waste management facilities, such as landfills, waste-
to-energy incinerators, transfer stations, material recovery facilities,
and composting operations.
Flow control is first and foremost about money.7 Prior to the
Carbone decision, flow control was a very effective means to assure
the financing of highly expensive solid waste facilities and opera-
tions that often cost hundreds of millions of dollars. Together
these facilities cost billions.
The Supreme Court's ruling in Carbone made it evident that,
absent congressional action, the utilization of flow control by states
and their political subdivisions cannot occur.8 The Senate passed
legislation, Senate Bill 534, which would legalize flow control for
facilities which employed it prior to Carbone, but not after.9 In
other words, the Senate sought to grandfather flow control but not
allow it future offspring. The House rejected similar legislation.
However, there is a good chance that bailout legislation will reap-
pear in the next Congress, and eventually be enacted.
This article characterizes the effort to legalize flow control as a
multi-billion dollar bailout of states and communities which threw
their lot in with flow control in order to facilitate the financing of
waste management activities. The bailout is not stated by its sup-
porters in Congress to be intended especially for any particular seg-
ment of the waste management market. If, however, outcomes are
evidence of intentions, then the bailout is intended for the waste-to-
energy incineration industry and the communities which formed a
partnership with this industry by employing flow control to get
waste-to-energy incinerators financed and built. This conclusion is
reached because the only waste management approach for which
flow control has national importance is for waste-to-energy facilities.
As such, the bailout exists for them.
7. "The primary factor driving the imposition of flow control ordinances is
economics." Id. at 5.
8. See id.
9. INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE ACT OF 1995, S.
REP. No. 52, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1995) (reporting on S. 534, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995)).
1996]
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This article examines several aspects of the flow control
bailout. Section II describes how flow control works to secure fi-
nancing for waste facilities. Section III examines the heavy state
and local government debt created by flow control supported facili-
ties and the aftermath of the Carbone decision. Section IV describes
the Senate bailout legislation. Section V describes the House's re-
jection of bailout legislation. Section VI examines the role flow
control plays in the different segments of the waste management
market. It concludes that the only portion of this market for which
flow control has national significance is for waste-to-energy facili-
ties. Section VII explores in detail the impact of flow control on
waste-to-energy facilities and discusses why communities made the
mistake of investing so heavily in them. Section VIII explains that,
because there are alternatives to finance waste management facili-
ties, flow control is not necessary. Lastly, Section IX concludes that
the bailout follows in the tradition of flow control, namely that both
are easy ways out of difficult problems.
II. MECHANICS OF FLOW CONTROL
It is necessary to begin this analysis by establishing an under-
standing of the purpose and operation of flow control prior to Car-
bone. Flow control is principally a financing measure, designed to
get state and local governments out of ajam, that is, how to dispose
of waste, and how to afford its disposal.1 0 Local governments typi-
cally build the waste facility and finance the construction through
revenue bonds. They also often contract with private waste man-
agement companies to operate the facilities. Flow control, by defin-
ing where the waste is disposed, essentially serves as a swift and easy
way to assure that bond markets provide the billions of dollars state
and local governments need to construct the waste facilities they
want.
10. Flow control is one method of securing financing for a facility. Another
method which often accompanies flow control is a contractual arrangement called
"put-or-pay." Sidney M. Wolf, The Solid Waste Crisis: Flow Control and the Commerce
Clause, 39 S.D. L. REv. 529, 538 (1994). In a put-or-pay arrangement, the local
government contracts to "put" a certain amount of waste at the incineration facil-
ity. Whether or not the community is able to provide this amount of waste at the
incinerator, it still must "pay" for it. In other words, the community is paying for a
specific level of capacity whether or not it is used. For waste-to-energy plants, fi-
nancial markets usually encourage - at least local governments know they implic-
itly demand - the put-or-pay arrangement. ALEX. BROWN & SONS, INC., CREDIT
WORTHINESS OF RESOURCE RECoVERY PROJECTS 9-10 (undated research investment
report). While flow control as a whole minimizes the financial risk for both the
local government and lenders to a facility, put-or-pay minimizes the risk for the
lenders and private operators of a facility.
4
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss2/2
BURNING BEAST
To build a waste management facility, one needs capital. One
may, indeed, need a great deal of capital, depending upon the size
and type of waste management operation envisioned. The transfer
station at issue in Carbone cost a modest $1.4 million dollars to
build." By comparison, a state-of-the-art landfill can easily cost
$150 million to construct.1 2 Waste-to-energy incinerators cost from
$30 million to $500 million to build.13 These figures, moreover, do
not take into account annual operating costs, which can easily
amount to millions of dollars for large waste-to-energy plants and
for landfills, interest costs, and decommissioning costs. For a waste-
to-energy incinerator, decommissioning includes the cost of dis-
mantlement and cleaning up any hazardous or noxious materials
from the site. For a landfill, decommissioning involves closing
costs that include: creating an adequate reserve fund to clean up
and secure the landfill once its useful life is over; closure and post-
closure actions such as capping the landfill; providing for a reuse
activity on top of the mountain of waste; installing air pollution and
ground and surface water pollution monitoring and abatement
equipment; maintaining the equipment; and responding to possi-
ble pollution after closing. It is a fact that waste facilities built with
genuine concern for proper environmental protection standards
are enormously expensive.
Lending for waste facilities, like many major public works, is
accomplished by the issuance of bonds. These bonds are under-
written by major brokerage houses and purchased in capital mar-
kets by pension funds, banks, mutual funds, wealthy individuals,
and others with financial means. A community, or a waste district
consisting of several communities, that wishes to build these facili-
ties wants not only to attract the necessary capital to build and oper-
ate them, but also wants to be able to pay back the millions to its
lenders. The lenders, of course, emphatically agree with this. Ac-
cordingly, the lenders will act to minimize the risk of default. Thus,
for the local governments, the less financially risky the project, the
lower the interest charges will become, and the easier it is to attract
financing.
It can be difficult, however, to find ready and advantageous
financing for multi-million dollar waste facilities. On its face, invest-
ing in an operation that puts garbage in a hole in the ground or in
11. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1680.
12. Wolf, supra note 10, at 537 n.61 (estimating proposed landfill in Oregon
to cost $148 million).
13. Id.
2671996]
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a big furnace is not particularly alluring. Past stories of serious pol-
lution problems by garbage facilities, and the prospect of environ-
mental liability do not improve this picture. Capital in a
competitive marketplace, furthermore, tends to flow to activities
with the highest return at the lowest risk, but the average investor
does not automatically associate high return and low risk with gar-
bage. Financing for waste facilities, therefore, is not a simple
operation.
Flow control, on the other hand, makes waste facilities ex-
tremely attractive investments. Although it is intended only to di-
minish the risk associated with investment, it goes far beyond that.
In fact, for all practical purposes, it wipes out the risk and virtually
assures repayment.
The business of garbage facilities is to receive garbage. There-
fore, the critical element for the financial security of a waste facility
is the commitment of a long-term supply of waste. Without an ade-
quate supply of waste, the facility cannot be financially successful.
Flow control ensures that a sufficient quantity of waste, called
"throughput," will pass through the facility. It literally kidnaps gar-
bage in a jurisdiction and holds it hostage for the facility. Garbage
cannot go anyplace else. In kidnapping the waste, flow control also
kidnaps the revenues derived from it. The revenues are derived
from a "tipping fee," the service charge of a facility for handling the
waste. Flow control makes it possible to guarantee that a facility will
receive enough waste to, in turn, guarantee sufficient revenue to
enable the paying off of bonds necessary to finance the facility.
Equally efficient as the revenue guarantee of flow control, is
how price setting is achieved for a waste facility which uses flow con-
trol. Flow control creates a monopoly for the facility that is desig-
nated to receive the waste, and that monopoly, in turn, fixes any
price it wants. The price, or tipping fee, is what is necessary to
construct and operate the facility, properly close it after its useful
life, and pay the debt service. In addition, it may also provide reve-
nue necessary to fund waste management planning, source reduc-
tion and recycling efforts, household hazardous waste collection,
and other activities which do not lend themselves to raising revenue
because those methods are not generally conducive to charging
user fees.
The price for disposal or management of solid waste at flow
control supported facilities is usually higher than competing facili-
ties. In the Carbone case, for instance, the waste hauler was com-
pelled to pay a tipping fee of $81 per ton at the transfer station
6
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designated by a New York town as opposed to $70 per ton at out-of-
state-facilities the hauler preferred. 14 The price disparity is often
much worse. In another flow control case, a waste hauler was
forced to pay $72 per ton at a public facility compared with $30 per
ton at a waste facility it owned but could not use because the waste
it collected was trapped in a flow control jurisdiction. 15
All other things being equal, people ordinarily seek the lowest
price for a product or service. "If we build it, they will come," is a
reasonable characterization of the expectation of a community that
approves the construction of a waste facility in its area. But all
other things are not equal with flow control. Flow control excludes
competition because it does not allow the garbage to be disposed of
at competing facilities offering a lower price. Instead, the paean of
a community governed by flow control is: "If we build it, they will
have to come." As a consequence, flow control creates an artificial
marketplace for waste, making it easier to finance otherwise diffi-
cult to finance waste facilities.
III. POST-CARBONA OUT-OF-CONTROL INDEBTEDNESS OF FLOW
CONTROL AND OTHER COSTS
Prior to Carbone, local governments and their lenders relied on
flow control to provide for zero risk in establishing waste facilities.
As a result of Carbone, this was an impossible, and ultimately danger-
ous, expectation. In the aftermath of Carbone, local governments
that turned to flow control face two unpleasant prospects: "disas-
ter," in the words of the head of NewJersey's municipal trash associ-
ation, 16 and "chaos," in the words of United States Senator Frank
Lautenberg of New Jersey1 7 Waste haulers and communities con-
fronted with a choice between the high cost of using facilities for-
merly protected by flow control and competing sites with much
lower costs are naturally going to choose the latter. Obviously, it is
an easy choice as a recent study by a consulting firm for Browning-
Ferris Industries, a large waste hauling company, has established.
14. Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at 1680. High Court Told Health, Safety Issues Justify Flow
Control, Burden on Commerce, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1493 (Dec. 10, 1993).
15. See Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 1387 (8th Cir.
1993).
16. 140 CONG. REC. H10,304 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Menendez).
17. 141 CONG. REc. S2573 (daily ed. Feb. 13, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
19961 269
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This study shows that, on average, flow control laws add forty per-
cent to waste disposal charges.18
After the Supreme Court decision in Carbone, Moody's Inves-
tors Service investigated the economic effect of the loss of flow con-
trol and found that landfills and waste-to-energy facilities were
losing revenue, and municipalities were having trouble selling
bonds to finance facilities. 19 Moody's investigation included a re-
view of the bond ratings of 100 solid waste facilities dependent
upon flow control. 20 ByJune 1995, after analyzing 76 facilities with
a total debt of $4.5 billion dollars, Moody's downgraded the bonds
of 14 solid waste management authorities, confirmed 62, and up-
graded none.21 Moreover, it determined that three-fourths of the
76 ratings reviewed had an unfavorable rating outlook due mostly
to the potential loss of flow control.2 2 Of particular note, Moody's
downgraded the waste bond rating of five New Jersey counties to
below investment grade status, which is tantamount to labeling
them junk bonds.23
Moody's was not the only entity in the investment community
showing concern for the repercussions of the loss of flow control.
On the eve of the Supreme Court decision in Carbone, investment
firms with a stake in flow control facilities, such as Municipal Bond
Investors Assurance, Inc., began to assess their exposure, should
flow control be invalidated by the Court.24 Municipal fund manag-
ers like John Nuveen & Co., holding $350 million in solid waste
bonds, and Van Kampen Merritt Investment Advisory Corp., with
$264 million in solid waste bonds, undertook investigations to de-
18. Flow-Control Laws Add 40 Percent To Waste Disposal Charge, BEI Says, 26 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) 198, 198-99 (May 12, 1995).
19. Solid Waste: Flow Control Decision Has Negative Effect on Financing of Waste
Facilities, Moody's Says, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1482 (Nov. 25, 1994).
20. Id.
21. Fow Control Results in Lower Bond Ratings; More Expected in Wake of High
Court Decision, 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 471, 471-72 (June 23, 1995). The downgrades
occurred in Connecticut, Florida, Maryland, Michigan, NewJersey, New York, and
Virginia. Id. Moody's published a report of its results. MOODYS INVESTORS SER-
VICE, MOODY'S MUNICIPAL CREDIT REPORT, SPECIAL, MOODY'S SOLID WASTE RATING
SURVEILLANCE AND RATING OUTLOOK: CREDIT RISK INCREASES IN A POST-CARBONE
WORLD (May 1995) [hereinafter MOODY'S REPORT].
22. See Flow-Control Results in Lower Bond Ratings; More Expected in Wake of High
Court Decision, supra note 21, at 472.
23. 141 CONG. REc. S3807 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Smith).
24. Jeff Bailey, Up in Smoke: Fading Garbage Crisis Leaves Incinerators Competingfor Trash, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Bailey, Up in Smoke] (indi-
cating that people are now looking at economics with regard to flow control).
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termine which projects were most vulnerable. 25 The bond insurer,
Ambec Indemnity, covering ten incineration projects, concluded
that the loss of flow control would be "very severe" for its business.26
Clearly, Carbone has had a considerable impact on the financial
community's interest in waste facilities.
Flow control has created other costs as well. It has produced
some serious mistakes in waste management by artificially easing
financing for environmentally and economically questionable facili-
ties. For example, there is a San Diego materials recovery facility
with recycling costs of $200 per ton. The city's daily newspaper has
called the facility a "monstrous mistake."27
The monopoly pricing accompanying flow control, further-
more, has forced both households and merchants to spend consid-
erably more than market prices for garbage collection and
recycling services. A waste company executive in Pennsylvania con-
tended that inefficient and illogical flow control laws in his state
caused a 974% increase in the cost of waste disposal within 10
years. 28
The actual total outstanding indebtedness of local govern-
ments for waste management facilities supported by flow control is
unknown. Figures mentioned by various sources include $10 bil-
lion,29 $18 billion,30 and range as high as $23 billion.3 ' Moody's
has rated over $9 billion in solid waste bonds.32 In Minnesota, the
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Flow Control Act of 1994; Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Superfund, Re-
cycling, and Solid Waste Management of the Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works on S. 2227, A Bill to Amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act to Provide Congressional
Authorization of Municipal Solid Waste and Other Purposes, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 42
(1994) [hereinafter F/ow Control Hearings] (statement of Richard Goodstein, Divi-
sional Vice-President, Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc.).
28. States Urge EPA to Support 'Wow Control" Waste Groups Say Issue Represents Bad
Policy, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 734 (Aug. 20, 1993) (referring to Scott Wagner, presi-
dent of York Disposal).
29. 140 CONG. REc. S6207 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger) (noting that outstanding debt owed by local governments on waste
management facilities is approximately $10 billion).
30. 140 CONG. REc. E991 (daily ed. May 19, 1994) (statement of Rep. Minge)
(noting that Carbone, "by overturning local ordinances[] handicaps responsible
solid waste management and undermines the security of as much as $18 billion in
outstanding municipal bonds").
31. 141 CONG. REC. S6428, 6430 (daily ed. May 10, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Lautenberg).
32. William J. Hogan, Assistant Vice-President and Manager of Solid Waste
Specialty Group in Moody's Investor Service's Public Finance Department, Address
at the Villanova Environmental Law Journal Symposium on Solid Waste in Interstate
Commerce: Federal, State and Local Roles (October 14, 1995).
1996]
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debt for flow control supported facilities stands at $325.4 million.33
It is nearly $500 million in both Virginia and California.3 4 The debt
is $600 million in Connecticut, $1.5 billion in NewJersey, and $3.2
billion in Florida.35
The figures become more comprehensible when attached to
specific waste facilities built with flow control because they repre-
sent actual communities which thought flow control would provide
them a safe perch from financial risk, but ended up putting them
out on a limb. The vulnerable debts range from a $17.9 million
materials recovery facility in Springfield, Missouri,3 6 to $46 million
borrowed for a proposed sewage sludge composting facility in Bur-
lington County, New Jersey,3 7 to $180 million in bond borrowing
for a waste-to-energy plant in Onondaga County, New York.3 8 The
Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority operates two recycling
facilities that are absolutely dependent on flow control. As a result,
the State of Connecticut could ultimately be liable for $520 million
in State revenue bonds which were floated to build these facilities.39
It is evident that state and local governments, which have built
flow control dependent facilities, stand the risk of hemorrhaging
financially. As such, it is no wonder that state and local govern-
ments who enjoyed the ease by which flow control allowed them to
finance waste facilities were its strongest supporters prior to Car-
bone,40 and why they now lead the charge for congressional restora-
tion of flow control.41 It should also be no surprise that their
creditors, the financial industry, want protection as well. The Pub-
lic Securities Association, which represents financial institutions
33. 140 CONG. REc. S6207 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 140 CONG. REc. H5457, 5458 (daily ed. June 30, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Smith).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. The Solid Waste Association of North America, which represents state and
local solid waste officials, the National League of Cities, together with the National
Association of Counties sought federal legislation to legalize flow control prior to
Carbone. Commentators Make Concerns Known to Panel on Draft Federal Fow-Control Leg-
islation, 24 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1924, 1924-25 (Mar. 11, 1994).
41. New Jersey, Maine, and Minnesota have argued strongly for federal legis-
lation to restore flow control authority with no limitations for the future. Among
those joining the post-Carbone cry to restore flow control were the U.S. Conference
of Mayors and Municipal Waste Management Association. Local Governments Tell
Senate Panel They Need Broad Authority to Direct flow of Solid Wastes, 25 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 505, 505-06 (July 15, 1994).
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holding state and municipal bonds, has urged Congress to grandfa-
ther flow control authority to existing flow control facilities to res-
cue what they say are $20 billion in bonds tied to these facilities. 42
In addition, states and communities are generally afraid to cre-
ate programs which raise property taxes. Through the use of flow
control these communities have been able to avoid using property
taxes to build and operate the expensive waste facilities of the kind
effectively financed by flow control. Failure to restore flow control
for communities which used it to finance waste facilities will likely
force them to turn to local taxation to help pay off the
indebtedness. 43
On the other hand, flow control legislation does not have the
universal support of communities. For instance, the executive di-
rector for the New York State Conference of Mayors and Municipal
Officials opposes the restoration of flow control, arguing that it in-
creases local property taxes. 44 Local officials in NewJersey, such as
the Mayor ofJersey City, strongly oppose flow control. 45 NewJersey
has the most comprehensive application of flow control in the na-
tion. The state directs the flow of solid wastes for each and every
community.46 The dissenting New Jersey officials argue that "flow
control limits the ability of local government to find low-cost, envi-
ronmentally sound disposal alternatives, and results in exorbitant
and unnecessarily high tipping fees."47 Haulers faced with high tip-
ping fees pass them onto households through high waste collection
fees. In states like New Jersey, where flow control supported facili-
ties are forced on communities, one cannot assume that all commu-
nities are happy with the high waste management costs inflicted
upon their residents. For instance, after Carbone, Haddon Heights,
42. Solid Waste: Markup of Solid Waste Measure Seen by April Without Additional
Hearings, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 2192, 2192-93 (Mar. 10, 1995).
43. At a Senate hearing held a month after Carbone, the chairman of the re-
gional waste system in Portland, Maine stated that he was worried that, without
flow control, the debts owed by facilities would have to be made up by local taxes
rather than current tipping fees. Local Governments Tell Senate Panel They Need Broad
Authority to Direct Flow of Solid Waste, supra note 41, at 505-06. This type of action
demonstrates that the artificially high monopoly charges for garbage, created by
flow control, are, in essence, merely substitutes for taxes.
44. Solid Waste: Markup of Solid Waste Measure Seen by April Without Additional
Hearings, supra note 42, at 2192-93.
.45. 141 CONG. REc. S3807, 3808 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Smith).
46. See SOLID WASTE AcT, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 13:1E-22 (West 1991), § 48:13A-5
(West Supp. 1993); N.J. ADMIN. CODE, tit. 7, § 26-6 (1995) (Solid Waste Manage-
ment Regulations).
47. 141 CONG. REc. S3807, 3808 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Smith).
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New Jersey sought to be released from a state requirement that it
send residents' garbage to a Camden County incinerator for $90
per ton. It preferred instead to use nearby solid waste facilities in
Pennsylvania which were charging only $50 a ton.48 The town con-
tended that such action would save it $130,000 per year and allow it
to be able to balance its budget. 49
The National Solid Waste Management Association (NSWMA),
the leading organization for public and private solid waste profes-
sionals, also opposes flow control even though some of its 2,500
members are beneficiaries of the legislation. According to the
NSWMA, flow control leads to economic inefficiency by creating
monopolies in the solid waste market and artificially raising the
price of disposal. This leads to increased costs to households in
communities which apply flow control to trash collection.50
Flow control increases the cost of disposal for businesses, a key
reason why major national representatives of the business commu-
nity have objected to it. Opponents of flow control include the Na-
tional Association of Independent Businesses, United States
Chamber of Commerce, International Council of Shopping Cen-
ters and Associated Business Contractors, as well as major corpora-
tions, hundreds of small businesses, and various local Chambers of
Commerce from all regions of the country. 5'
The opponents of flow control also include national and state
environmental organizations who believe that flow control encour-
ages the development of expensive facilities, such as landfills or in-
cinerators, and discourages more environmentally preferable
practices like source reduction, reuse, and recycling. For this rea-
son, the Sierra Club urged Congress to support only the
grandfathering of flow control and reject any broad legalization of
flow control.52 Similarly, the Natural Resources Defense Council
48. Federal Court Refuses to Issue Injunction Blocking Enforcement of N.J. Flow Con-
trol Law, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 421, 421-22 (June 24, 1994).
49. Id.
50. States Urge EPA to Support Tow Control; Waste Groups Say Issue Represents Bad
Policy, supra note 28, at 734. NSWMA called flow control "bad public policy" and
did not believe it led to environmental protection or economic efficiency. Id.
51. HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, STATE CONTROL OF MANAGE-
MENT OF SOIiD WASTE, H.R. REP. No. 738, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 27 (1994) (Dissent-
ing view). The Institute of Scrap Recycling Industries opposes flow control
because when applied to recyclable materials, it deprives them of access to the
materials. States Urge EPA to Support 'Fow Control' Waste Groups Say Issue Represents
Bad Policy, supra note 28, at 734.
52. Blake Early, director of the Sierra Club environmental quality program,
expressed support for legislation that would do no more than grandfather flow
control supported facilities in existence prior to Carbone, but would not support a
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wants Congress not to enact any kind of flow control rescue.53 Like-
wise, the New York Public Interest Research Group opposes legali-
zation of flow control and believes that the Carbone decision will
ultimately benefit recycling. 54
Finally, the waste collection and disposal industry, a $63 billion
dollar-a-year enterprise, strongly opposes flow control for the effect
it has on its balance sheet.55 These businesses can usually find
cheaper facilities at which to deposit waste they collect. In fact,
many of these businesses own their own waste control and disposal
facilities.
Marie Pisecki of Moody's Investors Service described flow con-
trol as a " 'legal device that allowed you to not look at the econom-
ics.' "56 It was meant to prevent waste flight, but now this waste is
fleeing from flow control protected facilities. Without an adequate
supply of garbage to generate revenue to pay off bonds, communi-
ties face impending financial trouble. Many communities fear that
their bonds will be downgraded, possibly even to junk status.57 The
extreme result is that local governments, which built and financed
facilities with flow control, risk the prospect of bond defaults. More
likely, however, is the risk of tougher budget choices and higher
taxes as they make up the shortfall. 58 The battle has been taken to
Congress.
broad grant of authority that would completely legalize flow control for the future.
In a letter to the House Energy and Commerce Committee a month and half after
Carbone, Early stated, "Your vote against authorizing flow control for future waste
management activities will help discourage new unneeded incinerators and re-
gional landfills and encourage a process that puts greater emphasis on solid waste
management planning, waste reduction, and recycling." Bill Would Ban Flow Con-
trol Authority, Protect Existing Contracts With Facilities, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 448 (July
1, 1994) (internal quotations omitted).
53. 141 CONG. Rrc. S3807, 3808 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Smith); Solid Waste: Markup of Solid Waste Measure Seen by April Without Additional
Hearings, supra note 42, at 2192-93.
54. H.R. REP. No. 738, supra note 51, at 27.
55. John Holusha, Here's a Switch: Now They're Fighting Over Garbage, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 23, 1994, at 8. One of the biggest waste collection and disposal firms in the
United States is Browning-Ferris Industries (BFI). It has been one of the chief
critics of flow control, probably because it operates so many facilities which must
compete with flow control-supported facilities. See, Flow Control Hearings, supra
note 27, at 40-45.
56. Bailey, Up in Smoke, supra note 24, at Al.
57. 141 CONG. Ruc. S3807 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Smith).
58. See 141 CONG. Rrc. S6428 (daily ed. May 10, 1995) (discussing interstate
transportation of municipal solid waste); 141 CONG. Rc. S3807 (daily ed. Mar. 10,
1995) (statement of Sen. Smith) (discussing interstate waste and flow control legis-
lation); 140 CONG. REc. H5457 (daily ed.June 30, 1994) (statement of Rep. Smith)
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IV. SENATE BAILOUT BILL
The Senate's bailout legislation involved a clash of titans. On
one side was the $63 billion waste hauling disposal industry. On the
other side were major waste facility companies, particularly those in
the waste incineration business, and state and local governments
now saddled with up to $23 billion in debt secured by flow control.
Local governments that employed flow control wanted Congress to
unconditionally overturn the Supreme Court decision and permit
communities to use flow control in the future. Waste hauling and
disposal firms, harmed by flow control, presumably wanted the
Court's nullification to stand so that flow control would disappear
altogether. Grandfathering was tolerable to waste firms, which, in
some instances, had facilities supported by flow control, but for the
most part competed with facilities which had the advantage of flow
control.59
Neither side received all that it wished for from the Senate bill
which was approved in May, 1995. Rather, the two major oppo-
nents, and the public, got what was needed. What the Senate
sought to do was to preserve flow control for those local govern-
ments who benefitted from it before Carbone, and were burned by it
afterwards.
The grandfathering of flow control meets the basic needs of
the stakeholders in the flow control debate.60 Those actually hurt
by the Supreme Court decision, namely the local governments
which suddenly saw themselves loaded down with difficult to repay
debt, were to get relief. On the other hand, flow control was not
legalized for future use; thus, this mistake was not perpetuated.
The Senate passed a compromise between the two major opposing
forces to achieve what one Senator called a "delicate balance."61
Since the federal courts had been split on the constitutionality
of flow control, and an adverse Supreme Court decision looked
likely, flow control dependent states and communities and their
congressional supporters had been urging a federal law legalizing
flow control even before the Supreme Court decision in Carbone.62
(discussing remedy to Carbone decision); 140 CONG. REc. E1319 (daily ed.June 24,
1994) (statement of Rep. Richardson) (discussing his opposition to flow control).
59. Pow Control Hearings, supra note 27, at 42.
60. Final Efforts on Interstate Transport, Municipal Flow Control Measure Fall Short,
25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1174 (Oct. 14, 1994).
61. 141 CONG. REC. S6489 (daily ed. May 11, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Chafee).
62. Linda S. Taylor, Solid Waste Flow Control and Interstate Commerce: Has the Sky
Fallen on Solid Waste Management in Minnesota? 14 (unpublished manuscript on file
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After Carbone, these same advocates of flow control legalization
sought a bailout of communities sinking in flow control created
debt.
Many supporters of the Senate bailout bill expressed mixed
feelings. One of the chief sponsors of the Senate bill, ultra-con-
servative Republican Robert Smith of New Hampshire, loathes gov-
ernmental interference with the free market such as that caused by
flow control. His concern, however, about relieving communities
in his state from flow control induced debt superseded his distaste
for government interference in the free market. This sentiment,
protecting local interests over free market ideology, was rampant in
the Senate, as illustrated by the unanimous 16-0 approval of the
Senate bill in committee, 63 and a 94-6 vote in the Senate as a
whole.64
Three major approaches for legalizing flow control received se-
rious consideration in the Senate. Each of the approaches utilized
some kind of grandfathering, but differed in the extent to which
grandfathering would be allowed.6 5 The most restrictive approach
to flow control legislation involved the "strict grandfather" ap-
proach, in which only those facilities actually in existence and using
flow control prior to Carbone could continue to use it. They would
only be permitted to use it until the debt incurred for construction
of the facilities was retired or until the end of the useful life of the
facilities. 66 Strict grandfathering would not allow governments in
the process of constructing a flow control facility as of May 15, 1994,
the date of the Carbone decision, to maintain the use of flow control.
Under this approach, a facility must be in existence before May 15,
1994 to be afforded flow control protection.
The most permissive approach suggested in the Senate used
the "system grandfather." Under this approach, states and local
with author) (stating in anticipation of Supreme Court in Carbone that it "seems
fairly improbable" Court would find flow control valid). Taylor is a Legislative
Analyst in the Research Department of the Minnesota House of Representatives.
Id.
63. All nine Republicans and seven Democrats approved the bill. 141 CONG.
REC. S6489 (daily ed. May 11, 1995) (statement of Sen. Chafee); Solid Waste: Senate
Panel Unanimously Approves Fow-Control, Waste-Import Legislation, 25 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 2374 (Mar. 31, 1995).
64. Legislation on Interstate Waste, Flow Control Passes Senate One Year After Car-
bone Decision, 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 212 (May 19, 1995).
65. S. REP. No. 52, supra note 9, at 8 (discussing three approaches to
grandfathering).
66. Id. This approach was represented in S. 485, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995), introduced by Senator Kay Hutchison (R-Texas). Solid Waste: Markup of
Solid Waste Measure Seen by April Without Additional Hearings, supra note 42, at 2192.
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governments that had a solid waste management system in place
predicated on flow control prior to Carbone could continue to use it
for future facilities planned as part of a waste management system,
without necessarily having these facilities built or designated for
flow control at the time of the Supreme Court's decision. 67 New
Jersey had the most to gain from this approach.
The middle ground, described as the "modified grandfather,"
included facilities covered by the strict grandfather, but also ex-
tended flow control to communities which made a substantial com-
mitment to the designation of waste management facilities prior to
Carbone.68 This compromise approach allows continued use of flow
control by governments that were operating solid waste facilities us-
ing flow control, or were in the process of constructing a flow con-
trol facility, as of May 15, 1994.69
One year after the Carbone decision, the Senate finally passed
Senate Bill 534, the Interstate Transportation of Municipal Solid
Waste Act of 1995, which adopted the "modified grandfather" ap-
proach. 70 Among other things, the bill provided general flow con-
67. S. REP. No. 52, supra note 9, at 8. The most permissive legalization ap-
proach was the "system grandfather" provision contained in S. 398, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1995), introduced by Senator Frank Lautenberg of New Jersey, a state
heavily dependent upon flow control. Id. at 8-9. This bill would grandfather flow
control ordinances in existence before Carbone, i.e., May 15, 1994, until current
contracts expire. Solid Waste: Markup of Solid Waste Measure Seen by April Without
Additional Hearings, supra note 42, at 2192. The bill would also subject future desig-
nations of disposal facilities to be subject to a competitive bidding process, with
specific criteria allowed to be set by local governments. Id. Future flow control of
commercial waste would not be legalized. Id. The Lautenberg bill was identical to
the flow control bill considered during the 103d Congress. Id. See, S. 2345, 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); H.R. 4779, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). See also, H.R. REP.
No. 738, supra note 51, at 12-24; Final Efforts on Interstate Transport, Municipal Fow
Control Measure Fall Short, supra note 60, at 1174; Solid Waste: Senate Passes Interstate
Waste Bill; Prospects for Final Approval Uncertain, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1148 (Oct. 7,
1994).
68. S. REP. No. 52, supra note 9, at 8.
69. Solid Waste: Markup of Solid Waste Measure Seen by April Without Additional
Hearings, supra note 42, at 2192. As originally introduced by Republican Senators
Robert Smith of New Hampshire, and John Chafee of Rhode Island, S. 534 con-
tained a modified grandfather provision. This bill, as numbered, would eventually
become the major legislation voted upon and passed by the Senate. The bill was
the major vehicle for two important reasons. First, it was considered and ap-
proved by the Senate Environment and Public Works Subcommittee on
Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment, which was chaired by Smith. Sec-
ond, Chafee was chairman of the full committee, which also approved the bill. Id.
See also Solid Waste: Senate Panel Unanimously Approves Flow Control, Waste-Import Legis-
lation, supra note 63, at 2374.
70. S. 534, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The Act consisted of three titles.
The first title covers interstate waste, the second covers flow control, and the third
exempts certain small and remote landfills from groundwater monitoring require-
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trol authority to state and local governments which had imposed it
by law and designated a facility as of May 15, 1994, prior to the
Carbone decision. 71 Several amendments, however, were adopted
during committee markups and floor debate which gave preferen-
tial treatments to at least nine states. This stretched the modified
approach in some states to near system grandfathering. Accommo-
dations were made for states that were intensively reliant on flow
control, such as NewJersey and New York. 72 The Senate included a
ments. See S. REP. No. 52, supra note 9, at 11-12, 13-27; Legislation on Interstate
Waste, Flow Control Passes Senate One Year After Carbone Decision, supra note 64, at 212.
71. Any state or local government which adopted and applied flow control
regulation before January 1, 1984 can designate a facility and continue to exercise
flow control authority for the useful life of the facility. S. 534, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995). A local government can exercise flow control authority if, prior to
Carbone, it was required by law to provide for the operation of solid waste facilities,
was required to engage in recycling, had implemented this authority through law
or contract, and had incurred significant financial expenditures to repay construc-
tion bonds for a flow control designated facility. Id. Any local government that
contracted with a public service authority for solid waste disposal prior to Carbone
may continue to exercise flow control until the expiration of the contract, or for
the life of the bonds issued for the construction of the facility to which the waste is
transferred or disposed. Id.
72. Legislation on Interstate Waste, Flow Control Passes Senate One Year After Car-
bone Decision, supra note 64, at 212. During full Senate consideration, amendments
covering situations in Vermont, New Jersey, New York, and North Carolina were
accepted on the floor of the Senate. Id. Several amendments, tailored to the flow
control situations of individual states, were accepted during markup of the bill in
subcommittee and committee. Solid Waste: Senate Panel Unanimously Approves Flow-
Control, Waste-Import Legislation, supra note 63, at 2374-75. Subcommittee and full
committee amendments to the bill were designed to grant flow control authority
to local governments in states with different waste management approaches. Id.
In mid-March, during the markup by the Senate Environment and Public Works
Subcommittee on Superfund, Waste Control and Risk Assessment, senators from
Virginia and New Jersey added provisions that allowed local governments in their
states to be grandfathered. Id. The full committee adopted an amendment by
Senator Bob Graham of Florida. Graham's amendment grandfathered local gov-
ernment flow control that lacked laws or ordinances prior to Carbone but exercised
flow control from states before that time and made significant financial expendi-
tures as well as having a 30% recycling goal. Id. The amendment gave protection
to 20 to 30 counties in Florida which would not have been covered by the bill
because they did not enact ordinances or statutes authorizing flow control. Id.
Senator Joseph I. Liebermann of Connecticut provided an amendment approved
by the full committee that provided flow control authority for contracts with a
public service authority which had issued bonds. Id. This reflected, for example,
two waste facilities operated by the Connecticut Resources Recovery Authority that
are absolutely dependent on flow control and were constructed with $520 million
in revenue bonds. New Jersey sought unrestricted flow control and Frank
Lautenberg of New Jersey had two amendments accepted by the full committee.
Id. The key amendment protected local governments exercising flow control from
litigation. Id. Although every state was not able to exert influence over the out-
come of the bill, individual states clearly had a hand in amending it to suit their
own needs. (Senator Dianne Feinstein of California complained that " 'nine states
have received some preferential treatment in this bill,' " but that $125 million in
California bonds was still threatened.) Id.
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sunset provision on grandfathering which ended flow control in
thirty years, which, not without coincidence, is the usual maturity
period for municipal revenue bonds.
Before Carbone, communities wanted waste facilities developed
with no financial risk, and sought to reach that end through flow
control. After Carbone, they wanted to be held harmless for the fi-
nancial consequences of flow control, and the Senate sought to give
them their wish.
V. HOUSE REJECTION OF FLOW CONTROL BAILOUT
The House of Representatives also tried to enact a flow control
bailout; but, to date, it has failed. On January 31, 1996, the House
voted against House Resolution 34973 which would have
grandfathered existing flow control laws much like the Senate
bill.7 4 The defeat of flow control in the House was stunningly lop-
sided, but not as disproportional as the flow control victory in the
Senate; 271 opposed the resolution, while only 150 supported it.75
According to Republican Congressman Thomas Bliley of Vir-
ginia, chairman of the powerful House Commerce Committee, and
sponsor of the defeated House bill, House reconsideration of flow
control in 1996 is unlikely.76 With no other House bills to consider,
backers of the House bailout bill indicated they would continue to
seek a flow control law, but that they were pessimistic.77 As a result
of the House vote, the Senate bill is moot. Enactment of bailout
legislation will, most likely, be shelved until after the November
election and the seating of the next Congress.
The House effort at flow control faced difficulty for several rea-
sons. Most fundamentally, the House of Representatives of the
104th Congress approach to legislation has often times been rash,
contentious, and all-or-nothing; its approach to flow control was
much of the same.78 The failure of flow control in the House, con-
73. H.R. Res. 349, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996).
74. Bill to Restore Flow-Control Authority Goes Down to Decisive Defeat in House Vote,
26 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1971 (Feb. 9, 1996).
75. 142 CONG. REc. H1062 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1996).
76. House Defeats Flow Control GFOA NEWSLETTER (Government Finance Of-
ficers Association), Feb. 9, 1996, at 3.
77. Bill to Restore Flow-Control Authority Goes Down to Decisive Defeat in House Vote,
supra note 74, at 1971.
78. The Senate, on the other hand, has been comparatively more willing to
engage in bi-partisanship, studied consideration, compromise, and moderate and
practical outcomes.
18
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss2/2
BURNING BEAST
sequently, is as much a result of the current institutional tempera-
ment of this body as the substance of the legislation.
In addition, the flow control measure rejected by the House
was brought to the floor in a highly unusual and controversial way.
Bliley bypassed his own committee and instead moved the bill di-
rectly to the floor through the fast-track procedure of suspending
House rules. Christopher Smith, a Republican Representative from
New Jersey, the state most reliant on flow control, persistently
pressed Bliley to suspend House rules in order to gain a quick vote
on a bailout.79 Legislation considered in this manner, however,
prohibits floor amendments and needs a two-thirds majority vote
on the floor for approval. Bliley and the House Republican leader-
ship appeared not to care whether they had the support or input of
Democrats in either the provisions of the flow control measure, or
in the matter of the extraordinarily expedited vote.
The fast-track procedure, with no amendments, no hearings,
and limited debate, was in sharp contrast with the procedure used
to pass the Senate bill. Senate Bill 534 was considered in commit-
tee, had bipartisan support, and underwent spirited discussion and
numerous amendments on the Senate floor. Many Democrat and
Republican House members were angered by the procedural ma-
neuvering to suspend the rules for a quick vote. 80 Democrats in
particular appeared to be sending a message that the House Repub-
lican leadership would have to deal with them if they wanted to
enact any future environmental legislation.81 Thus, the rejection of
the House legislation can be seen as a rebellion against the process
rather than as a referendum by House members on flow control
itself.8 2
Finally, another fatal flaw of the House measure was that, un-
like the Senate bill, it was not a comprehensive solution to inter-
state waste movement. Carbone essentially prevents states and their
local governments from imposing export bans on the interstate
movement of waste, which is the function of flow control as it traps
waste within a state's border. A bailout law would partially overturn
79. Smith was a sponsor of H.R. 2838, a very narrow bailout bill which called
for the protection of the outstanding debt on solid waste facilities only in New
Jersey. New Attempts Eyed to Move Narrow Bill Allowing Flow Control Under Some Condi-
tions, 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1801 (Jan. 26, 1996); f/ow Control Measure to Aid New
Jersey Receives Consideration by House Leaders, 26 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1771 (Jan. 19,
1996).
80. House Defeats Flow Control, supra note 76, at 3.
81. Steve Daniels, flow Control Hope Slim, SPRINGrFIELD UNION NEWS, Feb. 2,
1996, at 21.
82. Id.
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Carbone, to the extent that flow control would be grandfathered for
existing facilities. Many states, however, also wanted Congress to
overturn the 1978 Supreme Court decision in City of Philadelphia v.
New Jersey, which invalidated import bans erected by states to keep
out waste from other states.83 The debate over City of Philadelphia
and restricting waste movement largely cuts across geographic lines.
The two large waste exporting states of New Jersey and New York
now benefit from City of Philadelphia, and do not want other states to
be able to prevent waste importation. Midwest states, on the other
hand, have become unwilling waste importers, as waste disposal
firms have taken advantage of their extensive rural areas to site
large landfills meant to receive wastes from other states, including
those on the East coast. Due to the City of Philadelphia decision, the
Midwest states are relatively powerless to stop these waste imports,
and the House bill did not provide the relief desired by the waste
importing states.
The Senate bill contained interstate waste transportation provi-
sions that substantially loosened the grip of City of Philadelphia by
allowing states to impose restrictions on waste importing, but did
not go so far as to prevent them from banning it altogether. A ma-
jor appeal of the Senate bill was that it was a compromise that gave
the Eastern states, which depend on flow control and export huge
amounts of waste, relief from the Supreme Court ban on flow con-
trol, but at the same time gave the Midwest states relief from the
Supreme Court's position that waste importation could not be
barred.
The House was unable to produce a similar timely compro-
mise. The Bliley measure addressed only flow control, purposely
excluding interstate waste transportation. Ohio Republican Con-
gressman Michael Oxley introduced House Bill 2323,84 a two-title
bill addressing both flow control relief and restrictions on interstate
waste transportation.8 5 The Oxley Bill contained a "presumptive
ban" on interstate waste movement which would all but completely
overturn City of Philadelphia.s6 Bliley and Richard Armey from
Texas, the Republican Majority Leader of the House, were categori-
83. City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating New
Jersey regulation prohibiting importation of solid waste to public and private
landfills).
84. H.R. 2323, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
85. House Majority Leader Vows to Block "Presumptive Ban" on Interstate Waste, 26
ENV'T R.p. (BNA) 1380 (Dec. 8, 1995).
86. H.R. 2323, supra note 84.
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cally opposed to a presumptive ban.8 7 Armey and Bliley preferred
the approach of the Senate bill which allowed states to impose sig-
nificant restrictions on wastes flowing across their borders from
other states, but refused an automatic total ban on waste imports.88
In late November of 1995, Bliley asked Oxley to meet with Republi-
can Representative Bill Paxon of New York to seek a compromise
on the interstate waste section of H.R. 2323.89 The talks went no-
where, and the House moved instead on the Bliley proposal.
The inability to compromise on the interstate waste movement
issue by the two Republican Congressmen and the geographic divi-
sions they represented apparently forced the Republican leadership
to conclude that it had to advance a quick vote on flow control
alone. Further delay would have threatened the status of outstand-
ing waste facility bonds.90 For the last two years, the issues of flow
control and interstate waste transportation have been linked out of
necessity because national lawmakers believed that the only way to
secure enough votes to pass one was to include the other. The Sen-
ate recognized this connection in passing its version of flow control
legislation. Bliley and the Republican leadership of the House
promised that the link would be restored in the final conference
bill worked out with the Senate.9 1 Democrats were distrustful of the
Republican leaders' assurances, andso were Republican supporters
of interstate waste movement restrictions. Both groups ganged to-
gether to kill the House bill. With the defeat of House Resolution
349, Congress apparently will not be able to enact a flow control
bailout in 1996.
VI. FLOW CONTROL'S SLICE OF THE WASTE MARKET
There is no doubt that a substantial number of communities
have become dependent upon flow control. They are experiencing
financial stress and real confusion as a result of it being pulled out
from under them by the Supreme Court. There is also no doubt
that, on closer examination, flow control is not necessary for envi-
ronmentally or economically sound solid waste management. Flow
control, in fact, does not play a significant role in solid waste man-
87. House Majority Leader Vows to Block "Presumptive Ban" on Interstate Waste,
supra note 85, at 1380.
88. Id.
89. Id. Paxon represented the interests of waste exporting states like New
Jersey and New York. He favored allowing as much interstate movement of solid
waste as possible. Id.
90. Daniels, supra note 81, at 21.
91. Id.
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agement on a national scale. There is a great gulf between the real
necessity and actual importance of flow control, on the one hand,
and the justifications concerning sound waste management which
have been offered for creating and perpetuating flow control, on
the other.
The geographical reach of flow control is both broad and mis-
leading. Thirty-five states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
Islands, directly authorize flow control.92 Four other states allow
flow control indirectly through measures such as local solid waste
management plans and home rule authority.9 3 Heavy use of flow
control by localities appears to be concentrated in only a few states,
though some of these states are quite populous and are leading
waste generators. 94 Approximately one-third of New York9 5 coun-
ties have flow control ordinances. 96 Flow control has been in use in
NewJersey97 since 1979 and it covers all non-hazardous solid waste
in each of its 567 municipalities and 21 counties.98 In New Jersey,
flow control encompasses 14 million tons of solid waste disposed
annually and supports 31 facilities, together representing over $2
billion in capital investment. 99 These facilities were planned, tech-
nically reviewed, granted permits, and financed under the authority
of flow control. 100 Flow control has been relied upon since 1988 by
sixty-five of sixty-seven Pennsylvania 01 counties,10 2 and twenty-two
92. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, OFFICE OF SOLID
WASTE, MUNICIPAL AND SOLID WASTE DISION, REPORT TO CONGRESS, FLOW CON-
TROLS AND MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE ES-3 (March 1995) [hereinafter EPA REPORT].
93. Id.
94. For a state-by-state breakdown of waste generation and disposal methods,
see Jim Glenn & David Riggle, The State of Garbage in America, BIoCYcLE, April 1991,
at 34.
95. New York was the second leading generator of municipal solid waste in
1991 with 22 million tons, accounting for approximately 7% of the total national
generation of 293.6 million tons. Id.
96. Solid Waste: Long Island Waste Haulers File Suit over Municipal Row Control
Ordinance, 25 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 308 (June 17, 1994) (determining number of New
York counties with flow control ordinances).
97. New Jersey was the fifth leading generator of municipal solid waste in the
nation in 1991, with 14 million tons, approximately 4.8% of the country's waste
generation. Glenn & Riggle, supra note 94, at 34.
98. 140 CONG. REC. S7371 (daily ed. June 21, 1994).
99. Id.
100. Solid Waste: Markup of Solid Waste Measure Seen by April Without Additional
Hearings, supra note 42, at 2192.
101. Pennsylvania was the ninth leading generator of solid waste in 1991, with
nine million pounds, or 3% of national waste generation. Glenn & Riggle, supra
note 94, at 34.
102. CONG. REC., CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ONLINE VIA GPO ACCESS
[wais.access.gpo.gov.] (Oct. 7, 1994) (statement of Sen. Specter).
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counties in Minnesota'03 are also reliant on flow control. 104 These
statistics, however, only indicate the potential application of flow
control.
In March 1995, EPA submitted a report to Congress evaluating
flow control as a tool for solid waste management. This report an-
swered two questions posed by Congress. 10 5 First, EPA was to iden-
tify the impact of flow control on the protection of human health
and the environment. 106 Second, EPA was to identify the impact of
flow control on the development of State and local waste manage-
ment capacity and the achievement of State and local goals for
source reduction, reuse, and recycling.10 7 EPA concluded that in
both areas the impact of flow control was minor.
Eighty percent of municipal solid waste is managed in landfills
and in waste combusters. 108 EPA determined that flow control is
not necessary for protecting human health and the environment at
these kinds of facilities. 10 9 EPA pointed out that these facilities are
subject to state and federal regulations that are designed for the
express purpose of protecting human health and the environment
and that these regulations dictate the same level of protection
whether or not the waste facility is subject to flow controls. 110
Although flow control is touted by its supporters as playing a
significant role in managing solid waste in this country, EPA found
that flow control actually plays only a limited role in the solid waste
market as a whole. 1' EPA concluded that there is only one seg-
ment of the waste market, the large waste-to-energy facilities, where
flow control plays a major role.112 At least fifty-eight percent of the
waste received by waste-to-energy facilities is supported by flow con-
103. Minnesota generated 4.2 million pounds of municipal solid waste in
1991, 1.4 percent of all the waste generated in the United States. Glenn & Riggle,
supra note 94, at 34.
104. 140 CONG. REc. S6207 (daily ed. May 23, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Durenberger) (discussing municipal solid waste flow control in Minnesota).
105. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at ES-1.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at ES-5. Waste combusters include mass burn incinerators and waste-
to-energy plants.
109. Id. at ES-4 to ES-5. The EPA found that "[r]egardless of whether state or
local governments administer flow control programs, states are required to imple-
ment and enforce federally approved regulations that fully protect human health
and the environment. Accordingly, there is. no empirical data showing that flow
control provides more or less protection." Id.
110. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at ES-5.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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trol measures. 13 Of the 135 operating facilities, 61 have waste
guaranteed by flow control measures.' 14
Other than the waste-to-energy segment of the industry, EPA
found that flow control had only a limited role. For example, less
than three percent of the total recycling market is subject to flow
control. 115 Flow control, furthermore, is not usually applied to
landfills and composting facilities.11 6 In fact, EPA found no evi-
dence that it played any significant role in financing new landfills
or landfill expansions."17 EPA stated that private landfills have
shown the ability to raise substantial capital, which indicates that
investors are willing to finance the expansion of landfill capacity
without flow control. 1 8 Likewise, EPA found the use of flow con-
trol to direct yard trimmings to specific composting facilities to be
an uncommon practice and an insignificant factor affecting the
growth of the composting segment of the waste market.11 9
The term "recycling" carries positive public sentiment. Those
seeking to preserve flow control have attempted to exploit this sen-
timent by portraying flow control as crucial for building and run-
ning recycling facilities. Advocates of flow control legalization in
the Senate offered specific recycling facilities as prime examples of
waste management operations created as a result of flow control. 120
As previously noted, however, less than three percent of the total
recycling market is subject to flow controls.
Flow control is only significant for a particular subsegment of
the recycling market known as materials recovery facilities
(MRFs).121 In particular, flow control's primary importance is for
large, high-technology MRFs which require substantial capital in-
vestment.1 22 Considerably less costly, low-tech (and higher employ-
ment) MRF-based recycling programs are relatively untouched by
flow control.123 In 1992, flow control was used at 13% of the MRFs
113. Id.
114. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at ES-9.
115. Id.
116. Id. For example, EPA stated: "From a national perspective, flow controls
generally have not been an important factor in the compost segment." Id. at ES-6.
117. Id. at ES-0, 111-62.
118. Id. at ES-10.
119. Id. at 111-14. For EPA's discussion of the composting market segment,
see id. at 111-14 to 111-25.
120. 140 CONG. REc. H5457 (daily ed. June 30, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Smith).
121. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at ES-5. See also id. at 111-43 (discussing flow
control's role in recycling growth).
122. Id. at ES-7.
123. Id. at 111-43.
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(26 facilities); these MRFs handled 19% of the waste MRFs received
(1.1 million pounds). 24 This waste constituted a mere 2.7% of the
40 million tons of municipal solid waste subjected to recycling in
1992.125
There is a strong association between the magnitude of capital
costs and the use of flow control by MRFs. 126 Thirty-two percent of
the waste handled by high tech MRFs is supplied by flow control.
12 7
This amount dwarfs the seven percent of waste that flow control
supplies to low-technology, and thus, low capitalized, MRFs. 128
Flow control supporters contend flow control legislation is nec-
essary to carry out integrated solid waste management systems
(ISWM).1 2 9 ISWM involves use of different methods for handling
an entire waste stream and operates on a waste management hierar-
chy. This waste management hierarchy utilizes a preferred order of
solid waste management strategies. The pecking order starts at the
top with source reduction and proceeds downward to reuse, re-
cycling, waste-to-energy recovery, and finally, land disposal. 130
Many of the preferred components of ISWM do not lend them-
selves to generating revenues for their own support because they
cannot readily charge user fees similar to the tipping fees charged
by flow control supported facilities.131 EPA acknowledged the use-
fulness of flow control to raise revenues to support the various ele-
ments of ISWM by ensuring waste was transported to facilities
charging tipping fees. These fees then could be used, in part, to
fund non-revenue generating portions of an ISWM program.1
32
EPA noted, however, that while flow control provided an adminis-
tratively efficient method for local governments to fund ISWM,
there were other financial and organizational options that govern-
124. Id. at 111-26.
125. Id.
126. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-26.
127. Id. at ES-7.
128. Id. at ES-8.
129. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ONLINE VIA GPO ACCESS [wais.access.gpo.gov]
(June 27, 1994) (statement of Rep. Grams). Representative Grams stated, "In my
home state of Minnesota, county officials developed an integrated waste manage-
ment system premised upon state waste flow control laws." Id.
130. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-79. Flow controls are used to support
waste collection services such as curbside recycling and solid waste services, and
measures which do not generate revenues on their own, such as household hazard-
ous waste collections, source reduction, solid waste planning, and public awareness
programs. The costs of these measures are incorporated in the tipping fees of the
waste disposal and waste-to-energy facilities. Id. at ES-10.
131. Id. at 111-79.
132. Id. at 111-80.
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ments can and do use to support solid waste management activi-
ties.' 33  As such, EPA concluded that there was no data
demonstrating that flow control was essential for long term achieve-
ment of state and local goals for source reduction, reuse, and
recycling. 134
Finally, an early and persistent justification for flow control was
that it addressed the supposed crisis in disposal capacity, due chiefly
to mounting landfill closings around the nation.13 5 EPA has since
concluded that in a relatively short period, adequate capacity for
national and regional solid waste management has developed.1 36
Recycling and the substantial growth in new regional landfills and
landfill expansions are two of the key developments offsetting the
loss of capacity from landfill closings. 13 7 In fact, EPA concluded
that there was no data demonstrating that flow control is essential
for the development of new solid waste capacity.' 3 8
The best measure of the real impact of flow control is the
amount of waste it covers in important sectors of the waste market
which, as EPA established, is limited. Flow control affects the waste-
to-energy segment of the waste market, but it only plays a minor
role in recycling and is usually not applied to landfills and compost-
ing facilities.' 3 9 On this scale, flow control is not a national prob-
lem and arguably is not deserving of a national solution in the form
of a congressional bailout. The group most reliant upon flow con-
trol consists of the communities which used flow control to help
build waste-to-energy facilities and their private operators and
bondholders, and it is for this group that Congress is considering a
federal bailout.
Waste-to-energy is one type of facility utilized in the burning or
combustion of municipal solid waste. 140 These plants recover heat
from the combustion of waste to produce either steam or electric-
ity.' 4' The second kind of facility burns waste without energy recov-
ery.142 Not surprisingly, the vast majority of waste combustion
133. Id. at 111-80 to 111-83.
134. Id. at ES-5.
135. Wolf, supra note 10, at 529-31.
136. EPA REPoRT, supra note 92, at 111-76.
137. Id. at 111-78.
138. Id. at ES-5. EPA did note that flow control might be desirable to provide
in-state self sufficiency for state and local jurisdictions. Id. at ES-1 1, 111-76.
139. Id. at ES-10, 111-62.
140. Id.
141. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at ES-10, 111-62.
142. Id. at ES-8.
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occurs at waste-to-energy facilities. Of the thirty-two million tons of
municipal solid waste burned in 1992, waste-to-energy facilities ac-
counted for thirty-one million tons while incinerators only ac-
counted for one million tons.1 43
Most of the benefit of a bailout would be realized by waste-to-
energy facilities, 44 the only segment of the waste market where
flow control plays a major role on a national scale. 145 The high
percentage of waste-to-energy facilities with flow control is partly at-
tributable to the substantial capitalization required to construct
waste-to-energy facilities, which are ordinarily financed by long
term bonds.1 46 EPA reported that in 1992, the average initial capi-
tal cost for existing waste-to-energy facilities was $60 million. 47 The
average capital costs for similar facilities being constructed today is
$136 million, primarily because these facilities are large, modem,
and must employ up-to-date pollution control equipment.1 48 As
such, waste-to-energy facilities need to ensure an adequate, long-
term supply of waste at high levels of capacity in order to generate
revenues sufficient to service their debt and costs.1 49 Accordingly,
waste-to-energy facilities supported by flow control receive, on aver-
age, three times more waste than waste-to-energy facilities unsup-
ported by flow controls.1 50 In other words, big, expensive waste
burners are much more likely to have flow control than smaller, less
costly energy recovery incinerators. In short, if a community wants
to build an enormously expensive waste-to-energy plant it inevitably
must rely upon flow control.
The private sector has a stake in most of the waste-to-energy
facilities, because most of these plants are privately owned and/or
operated. Much of the bailout, consequently, is aimed at the pri-
vate sector. Private companies have an ownership or operational
role for eighty-four percent of the waste-to-energy throughput.1 51
This percentage includes most of the larger waste-to-energy facili-
ties.' 52 Of 135 operating waste-to-energy facilities in the nation, 58
are privately owned and operated, 34 are privately operated and
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at ES-9.
146. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at ES-9.
147. Id. at 111-46 n.52.
148. Id. at 111-46 n.5.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 111-47.
151. EPA RPoRoT, supra note 92, at 111-58.
152. Id.
1996]
27
Wolf: Congressional Bailout of Flow Control: Saving the Burning Beast
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1996
290 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. VII: p. 263
publicly owned and 43 are publicly owned and operated.1 53
Twenty-three of the 58, or about 39.5%, of the privately owned and
operated facilities receive flow control protection from local gov-
ernments. 15 4 A smaller percentage of the publicly owned and oper-
ated facilities required flow control or contract arrangements to
guarantee waste throughput. 55 Fifteen of the forty-three publicly
owned and operated facilities use flow control. Of the thirty-four
publicly owned and privately operated facilities, twenty-three are
undergirded by flow control.' 56
Flow control is just one of two measures privately owned or
operated facilities have obtained from state and local governments
to minimize their risk of investment and enhance their prospects
for profit. These facilities have also obtained contract guarantees,
most typically put-or-pay arrangements. 157 The combination of flow
control and contract guarantees applies to eighty-nine percent of
all waste-to-energy throughput. 158 By comparison, a mere eight of
the fifty-eight privately owned and operated facilities operate with-
out either flow control or contractual guarantees,' 59 and only five
of the thirty-four privately operated/publicly owned facilities bene-
fit from neither measure. 160 Twenty-one of the forty-three publicly
owned and operated facilities, however, do not have the protection
of flow control or contractual guarantees. 16'
Prior to Carbone, the combination of flow control and put-or-
pay arrangements was instrumental in securing financing for waste
facilities. When flow control was invalidated by the Supreme Court,
it turned lethal. Under put-or-pay, local governments must guaran-
tee a certain amount of waste to the designated facility, whether or
not waste is forthcoming. With flow control, the tipping fees for
the wastes offset these costs. Without flow control, however, local
governments with existing put-or-pay contracts must ante up the ex-
tra funds when tipping fees fail to cover the costs.' 62
153. Id. at 111-54.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-54.
157. For a discussion of put-or-pay arrangements, see supra note 10.
158. EPA R.PORT, supra note 92, at 111-54.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Final Efforts on Interstate Transport, Municipal Flow-Control Measure Fall
Short, supra note 60, at 1174.
28
Villanova nvironmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss2/2
BURNING BEAST
VII. BAILING OUT THE BURNING UP OF WASTE
There are two major kinds of waste-to-energy incinerator
plants: mass-burn plants and refuse-derived fuel (RDF) plants. 163
Mass-burn plants burn unprocessed garbage, not generally requir-
ing sorting and removal of recyclables prior to combustion 164 RDF
plants process the garbage prior to burning to sort out materials
which are difficult to combust along with recyclables.' 65 Incinera-
tion, however, does not have a successful track record in this coun-
try, and the incineration industry was not a model which should
have encouraged confidence and optimism.
In the 1970s, the early generation of American incinerators,
the RDF plants, were plagued by mechanical problems, explosions,
and pollution problems.1 66 Thirty-two of the sixty American plants
suffered unscheduled shutdowns lasting one week or more. 167 Ad-
ditionally, sixteen of the plants were closed well before their ex-
pected twenty-year life-spans reached expiration.168 Thus, even
before the adoption of mass-burn plants from Europe, the Ameri-
can incineration industry suffered extensive problems. 69
During the 1980s, the incineration industry hawked a technol-
ogy in mass-burn plants which they claimed worked well in Europe
and could be successfully transplanted in the United States.' 70 Ad-
vocates claimed that the European mass-burn plants would replace
the previous and largely unsuccessful American RDF method of in-
cineration. Prior to the mid-1980s, only twenty-nine percent of ex-
isting incinerators in the United States were mass-burn facilities.' 7'
163. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-49.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Thomas J. Maier, Trying a European Import, NEWSDAY, Dec. 15, 1987, re-
printed in, The Rush to Burn: America's Garbage Gamble, NEWSDAY (reprint 1988), at
28.
167. Id. at 25.
168. Id. By 1987, at the peak of a national campaign to build and site new
incinerators, the garbage incineration industry had already been hit by mechanical
failures that closed $720 million worth of waste-to-energy plants and resulted in
unscheduled shutdowns in more than half of the operating plants. Richard C.
Firstman, High-Stake Risk on Incinerators: Billions Spent on Plants Amid Concern Over
Cost and the Environment, NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 1987, reprinted in, NEWSDAY (reprint
1988), at 4.
169. As already noted, the United States developed the RDF technology.
Maier, supra note 166, at 28. In RDF systems, the garbage is sorted before it is
burned and chopped into pellets which are combusted to produce electricity.
RDF proved to be costly and plagued by problems. RDF plants experienced fires
and explosions and 10 were permanently shutdown due to these problems. Id.
170. Id. at 25.
171. Id.
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Afterwards, two-thirds of the new plants being built were mass-
burners. 172
There was little hope in adapting the American technology to
create larger incinerators able to handle the large quantities of
waste expected to come from closing landfills. The industry re-
sponded to the troubles, caused by a decade and a half of cost over-
runs and plant failures for its home-built RDF technology, by
promoting the adoption of European mass-bum technology. Even
then, critics considered the switch to costly European technology to
be a risky gamble. 173
The initial experiences with the European borrowed technol-
ogy were not encouraging. 74 Saugus, Massachusetts was one of the
first communities to adopt a European-style resource recovery in-
cinerator in 1975. The incinerator was built by what eventually be-
came Wheelabrator Environmental Systems, a major player in the
incineration boom of the 1980s. For the first four years, the plant
experienced numerous shutdowns, and required a financial bailout
from the federal government to repay $11 million in repairs.1 75
The same company which built the Saugus facility constructed a
second waste-to-energy plant for Pinellas County, Florida in 1983,
costing $160 million.176 This incinerator suffered so many expen-
sive mechanical problems that it was unable to meet its bond pay-
ments for two years.1 77 A year later, nonetheless, Wheelabrator
opened a European-style incinerator in Westchester County, New
York. This plant also proved to be unexpectedly costly to operate,
and the county taxpayers had to pay nearly $30 million in three
years to cover a shortfall in electricity revenues. 178 Interestingly,
Wheelabrator ultimately conceded that the European technology
could not be transferred to this country without difficulty.1 79
One problem facing the American waste industry was its lack of
experience with the technology it was borrowing from Europe. In
fact, most of the companies selling the plants had little experience
172. Id. Mass burn facilities presently account for two-thirds of the waste han-
dled by waste-to-energy plants, nearly 21 million tons in 1992. EPA REPORT, supra
note 92, at 111-49 to 111-50. RDF plants now account for nine million tons. Id.
173. Key Findings on the Crisis, NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 1987, reprinted in, The Rush to
Burn: America's Garbage Gamble, NEWSDAY (reprint 1988), at 4 (hereinafter Key
Findings].
174. Maier, supra note 166, at 23.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Maier, supra note 166, at 23.
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building or operating them.180 Indeed, four of the ten leading
firms had never built an incinerator, and two others, by 1987, had
built only one each.181 The transplanted technology, furthermore,
did not have a long-term track record of success for the manner in
which it would be used in this country,1 2 and it had virtually no
operating history in the United States.'83 Due to the difference be-
tween American and European garbage systems, it was questionable
whether these European incinerators would be trouble-free in the
United States over the long-term. 84 The waste industry, of course,
claimed the new incinerator technology was proven. It was not,
however, proven in American circumstances.
The waste industry also faced significant environmental and
economic differences between the European and American gar-
bage situations, which should have raised healthy skepticism over
whether European incineration technology could be successfully
transplanted to the United States. Economically, one major differ-
ence between European mass-bum plants and their American
counterparts was size. The largest European plants are still only
about half the size of the big American facilities planned and built
during the 1980s.185 In addition, because the early 1980s was a time
of rising energy prices coupled with efforts to make alternate
sources of energy available,' 86 investors dictated that American
incinerators generate electricity, unlike their European counter-
parts.' 87 The American plants, consequently, were oversized appli-
cations of the European incinerators aimed at generating more
electricity. 88 Conversely, more than seventy percent of European
mass-burn plants primarily recovered steam or no energy at all
rather than producing electricity. 89
Economics is less a factor for European incineration than for
this country. In Europe, energy recovery is less about making
180. Firstman, supra note 168, at 4.
181. Id.
182. Key Findings, supra note 173, at 4.
183. Firstman, supra note 168, at 4.
184. Id.
185. Adrian Peracchio, W. Germany Combines Recycling, Burning, and Conserva-
tion, NEWSDAY, Dec. 15, 1987, reprinted in, The Rush to Burn: America's Garbage Gam-
ble, NEWSDAY (reprint 1988), at 24-25.
186. Jeff Bailey, Poor Economics and Trash Shortage Force Incineration Industry
Changes, WAL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1993, at A2 [hereinafter Bailey, Poor Economics].
187. Peracchio, supra note 185, at 25.
188. Firstman, supra note 168, at 7.
189. Maier, supra note 166, at 23.
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money than in the United States, 190 where in the 1980s, energy
sales accounted for more than half the revenues of the large Ameri-
can plants.191 These differences resulted in much more expensive
plants with many more problems. 192 The new American mass-burn
facilities were, on average, nearly twice as costly to construct as their
European counterparts.193 The European plants were not proven
to be more reliable than the previous generation of unreliable
American plants, yet the industry built them. As a result, half of the
mass-bum facilities in operation in 1987 experienced unscheduled
shutdowns, while three have been closed permanently. 194
American mass-burn facilities also faced different environmen-
tal problems than their European counterparts. The principle
problem existing on the environmental side was that American gar-
bage was different and more likely to cause air pollution and
mechanical problems than European garbage. The American gar-
bage included more plastics and other products which Europeans
recycled. The garbage burned in American mass-burn facilities
generated more acid gases which led to more pollution and dam-
aged plant equipment. 95 The builders of waste-to-energy plants,
moreover, downplayed and sometimes ignored the health risks re-
sulting from air pollution and toxic ash.196 In addition, American
mass-burn facilities had a higher rate of corrosion as a result of the
plants having to operate at the higher temperatures necessary to
generate electricity. 197 A final environmental concern was the ash
generated by mass-burn plants, which amounted to ten percent of
the volume and up to thirty-five percent of the weight of the origi-
nal garbage.1 98
Not everyone was caught up in the incinerator-building boom.
Many experts cautioned against premature adoption of unproven
European technology. Discussing transplanting European mass-
burn incinerators to the United States, the former chairman of the
solid waste branch of the American Society of Mechanical Engi-
neers stated, "[t] he only thing that is proven is that it's very costly
190. Firstman, supra note 168, at 7.
191. Id.
192. Maier, supra note 166, at 25.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Firstman, supra note 168, at 7.
196. Key Findings, supra note 173, at 4.
197. Maier, supra note 166, at 23.
198. Id.
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and still has a lot of bugs in the technology."1 99 Wheelabrator, the
contractor that built so many of the new mass-burn facilities, itself
acknowledged in company documents that the European mass-
burn technology "is not directly transferrable to the U.S. for various
reasons." 20 0 The reasons they cited, among others, included the
smaller size of the European plants, chemical differences between
the two countries' wastes which could create mechanical problems,
and generally lower steam temperatures and pressures in Eu-
rope.20 1 In the midst of the rush to burn, a report from Moody's
Investors Service, in 1987, declared that "[a] resource-recovery
plant project may not be suitable for every municipality and such a
project entails major risks."20 2
The bright future painted by incinerator advocates clashed
with the bleak reality of incineration existing at the time. The new
incinerators were costly and frequently unreliable. They were heav-
ily subsidized by electricity ratepayers. They contributed to air pol-
lution and generated huge quantities of toxic ash. They did not
eliminate the need for landfills, to which the ash itself had to be
disposed. Lastly, these incinerators undercut cleaner and cheaper
waste management strategies, chiefly recycling, and in some in-
stances made meaningful recycling impossible. 2
0 3
In the 1980s, municipalities stampeded into incineration, and
the amount of municipal solid waste combusted at waste-to-energy
facilities expanded ten-fold.20 4 During this decade, there were
great plans and expectations for the growth of waste-to-energy
plants. For instance, in 1987 there were 93 plants operating, an-
other 115 under construction or development, and scores more
planned. At the very least, 200 plants were expected to be in opera-
tion by 1992. What has been called "the rush to burn," represented
one of the biggest collaborations of public works and private indus-
try in our history.2 0 5 However, by the end of the 1980s the incinera-
tion craze had itself nearly burned out. Today there are only 135
waste-to-energy plants, not the projected 200.206
Why were these incinerators built in the first place? Much of
the cause can be attributed to the much ballyhooed "solid waste
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Maier, supra note 166, at 23.
203. Firstman, supra note 168, at 5.
204. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-58.
205. Id.
206. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-49.
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crisis." 20 7 This crisis appears not to be as bad and immediate as
initially feared. In addition, the fear appears to have been fueled by
the incinerator industry and its allies. Companies and communities
dove into the incineration business during the 1980s, operating on
the premise that landfill capacity was shrinking.208 That assump-
tion has not proven to be true, at least in the short-run. The de-
cline in the total number of landfills has not affected total landfill
capacity.20 9 Municipalities overestimated the amount of trash they
and others would be generating for the incinerators. In particular,
economic recessions reduced the expected rate of garbage genera-
tion, thereby helping to make these estimates incorrect.210 Land-
fill capacity, moreover, had been unexpectedly maintained by the
successful diversion of waste materials to growing composting and
recycling markets in the 1980s, with recycling especially experienc-
ing tremendous growth in the late part of the decade.2 11 The geo-
graphic range of modern landfills has also expanded. Their
capacity is now available to more distant communities. This devel-
opment has produced favorable economies of scale.212
The rush to burn is only partly explained, however, by the fear
of a solid waste crisis and the projected need to seek alternatives to
dwindling landfill space. Fanning the flames of this craze were
business interests which saw or obtained lucrative profits from a
quick and huge expansion of the waste-to-energy market.2 13 A
political-business coalition arose to beat the drum and profit from
the selling of incineration. 21 4 This coalition, comprised of makers
and operators of incineration plants, financial services institutions,
construction companies, lawyers, and consultants used its consider-
able influence to promote the growth of an industry from which it
wished to profit handsomely. Particularly important to the develop-
ment of this environment was the lack of guidance given to states
207. See Bailey, Poor Economics, supra note 186, at A2; Bailey, Up in Smoke, supra
note 24.
208. Bailey, Poor Economics, supra note 186, at A2.
209. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-64.
210. Bailey, Up in Smoke, supra note 24, at Al.
211. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-75.
212. Firstman, supra note 168, at 4.
213. See generally Firstman, supra note 168, at 4-9.
214. Public officials in the mid-1980s were being pressured into a solution to
the capacity crisis that some predicted would be a massive environmental and eco-
nomic catastrophe. Id. Firms which had or sought to build incinerators promoted
waste-to-energy plants as the panacea to the solid waste crisis. Indeed, waste and
incineration companies themselves stimulated the waste-to-energy buildup by con-
tinuing to promote the "garbage crisis" despite a disposal glut in many areas. Bai-
ley, Poor Economics, supra note 186, at A2.
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and local governments regarding solid waste management by the
federal government during the Reagan years. It was these public
and private factors that helped provide an environment conducive
to the easy, mostly unobstructed growth of incineration.
In the public realm, the intentional abandonment by the Rea-
gan and Bush Administrations of environmental regulation helped
to bolster the incineration rush.215 The failure or refusal of the
states and EPA to regulate stringently the most serious pollution
problems of incinerators was a big break for the incineration indus-
try. The two environmental problems facing incineration were air
pollution and what to do with the ash produced by incinerating
garbage. 216 State environmental regulators regularly lowered and
softened air pollution requirements to encourage incinerators.2 1 7
Likewise, despite the fact that EPA reports indicated the ash con-
tained dangerous levels of cadmium, lead, and dioxin, EPA refused
to treat incinerator ash as hazardous waste, which would subject it
to considerably more expensive disposal at hazardous waste facili-
ties rather than municipal landfills.218
The incinerator industry itself received direct governmental
assistance in the form of two federal subsidies. The federal govern-
ment granted generous tax breaks to investors and operators of in-
cinerators and required utilities to purchase the electricity
generated.2 19 Prior to 1986, federal tax law provided large tax
breaks for private capital investment in incinerators including in-
vestment tax credits, energy tax credits, and accelerated deprecia-
tion.220 Investment in private incinerators escalated between 1984
and 1986 to take advantage of these tax breaks.221 The 1986 Tax
215. Firstman, supra note 168, at 4.
216. For a discussion of the environmental problems created by the ash gen-
erated by incinerators, see Michelle Slatalla, The Trash of Incineration, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 16, 1987, reprinted in The Rush to Burn: America's Garbage Gamble, NEWSDAY (re-
print 1988), at 29-32. For a discussion of the air pollution problems of incinera-
tors, see Michelle Slatalla, Vaying Tests and Results Fuel Debate, NEWSDAY, Dec. 16,
1987, reprinted in The Rush to Burn: America's Garbage Gamble, NEWSDAY (reprint
1988), at 32-33.
217. Michelle Slatalla, Oregon Fits Emission Level to the Plant, NEWSDAY, Dec. 16,
1987, reprinted in The Rush to Burn: America's Garbage Gamble, NEWSDAY (reprint
1988), at 31.
218. Firstman, supra note 168, at 8. In 1994, however, the Supreme Court
ordered EPA to regulate incinerator ash as a toxic waste. City of Chicago v. Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund, 114 S. Ct. 1588 (1994).
219. Key Findings, supra note 173, at 4.
220. Bob Porterfield, Incinerators Hot on Wall Street, NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 1987,
reprinted in The Rush to Burn: America's Garbage Gamble, NEWSDAY (reprint 1988), at
42. See also, Bailey, Poor Economics, supra note 186, at A2.
221. Porterfield, supra note 220, at 42.
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Reform Law, however, scaled back these tax advantages, and
thereby led a shift away from private and toward public ownership
of the plants. 222 Local governments turned to incineration compa-
nies to build, lease, and then operate the plants. This development
served to make private investment attractive because the incinera-
tor bonds created were tax-exempt municipal securities. 223 The ex-
emption of municipal bond holders from federal taxes essentially
amounted to taxpayer subsidization of incinerator construction. 224
Federal action also encouraged municipalities to support
waste-to-energy plants through the terms of the 1978 Public Utilities
Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA).225 PURPA required utilities to
buy electricity from alternative power sources, such as resource re-
covery plants, at a price it would ordinarily pay to produce the elec-
tricity.2 26 Some states, like New York, set rates even higher.2 27 The
result was that electric utility customers were subsidizing the build-
ing of the new incinerators. 228 In fact, one source estimated this
electrical ratepayer subsidy amounted to roughly half the operating
costs of new waste-to-energy plants. 229
At the same time, EPA, during Reagan's tenure, cut its solid
waste policy staff from 128 to 1 employee.230 State and local gov-
ernments, consequently, did not receive needed guidance on solid
waste management, and serious questions regarding the air pollu-
tion generated by incinerators were left unaddressed. 231 As a result,
local governments were forced to make crucial decisions on their
own about what to do with their garbage. 23 2
The abdication of responsibility by the federal government left
a vacuum into which private sector interests rushed. These inter-
ests would be enriched if local governments turned to incinerators
as the solution to their garbage problems.233 Communities, fearing
what they saw as a looming solid waste crisis, were left out on a limb
when federal and state governments retreated from their roles as
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Firstman, supra note 168, at 7.
225. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
226. Maier, supra note 166, at 23.
227. Id.
228. Firstman, supra note 168, at 7.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 5.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 7.
233. Firstman, supra note 168, at 5.
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regulators and advisors on solid waste issues during the 1980s. 2 34
Looking for guidance, these communities turned to the same engi-
neering consultants that municipalities generally rely upon for ad-
vice regarding public works projects and problems. 23 5 These
consultants, however, had a vested interest in encouraging and con-
vincing communities to turn to incinerators. 23 6 As one public inter-
est advocate noted, consulting engineers do not make money when
they advise communities to concentrate their efforts on non-engi-
neered, low-tech solutions such as recycling. 23 7 Recycling had
proven successful in the 1980s, but in communities which were ad-
vised to put their chips in incineration, hundreds of millions of dol-
lars were invested in this option, while only a fraction of that went
to recycling.2 38 Even if self-interest was not involved, engineering
firms had, and still have an inherent bias toward large-scale techno-
logical solutions.23 9 Thus, it was not uncommon for consulting
firms to work both sides of the incineration business. First, they
would advise communities to open up incinerators. Then, these
same people were hired by incinerator firms for regulatory design
and construction assignments. 240
Investment banking firms and other institutional investors saw
a bright, highly profitable future in incineration. From 1982 to
1987, the heyday for communities jumping on the incineration
bandwagon, investment banking firms reaped about $194 million
in fees for packaging bond issues for incinerators. 241 Large finan-
cial service firms encouraged investment in incinerator ventures
through bonds and saw the incinerator business as offering tremen-
dous, long-term potential for capital gain.242 In fact, one major in-
234. Walter Fee & Richard C. Firstman, The Expense of Expertise, NEWSDAY, Dec.
18, 1987, reprinted in The Rush to Burn: America's Garbage Gamble, NEWSDAY (reprint
1988), at 40-43.
235. Id.
236. Id. Walter Hang of the New York Public Interest Research Group noted
that consulting engineering firms make money when they say, "We'll design an
incinerator, we'll help you finance it, we'll help you build it, we'll help you operate
it." Id. Put simply, engineering consultants had a substantial financial interest in
incinerators being built. See also, Firstman, supra note 168, at 9.
237. Fee & Firstman, supra note 234, at 42 (reporting remarks of Walter Hang
of New York Public Interest Research Group).
238. Key Findings, supra note 173, at 4.
239. Fee & Firstman, supra note 234, at 42.
240. Id.
241. Porterfield, supra note 220, at 42.
242. Id. These institutional investors included John Hancock Mutual Life In-
surance Company, Ford Motor Credit Corporation, and General Electric Credit
Corporation. Id. An example of the bountiful long-run investment expectations
of private investors can be found in a Peekskill, New York incinerator built by
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surance company went so far as to become not just a lender, but
also a partner in incinerators.2 43
Those who suffered declines in other businesses also saw incin-
eration as a highly profitable venture, and therefore as a path to
recovery. Large engineering and construction firms in the dwin-
dling nuclear power business viewed waste-to-energy facilities as a
new line of business. 244 Likewise, incinerator companies which had
built or operated problem-plagued plants using American technol-
ogy during the 1970s, saw the European style plants as a means to
revive their industry. Although many construction companies and
waste management firms had very little experience building and
running incinerators, lack of experience did not stifle their ef-
forts.245 For example, one of the largest waste-to-energy plant
builders was under contract in 1987 to build fourteen plants for
$2.3 billion even though, at the time, it had only three plants in
operation, none older than fourteen months. 246
The politics of influence was crucial to the industry's develop-
ment. In New York, the incineration industry regularly made con-
tributions to New York City council candidates. 247 For instance,
Hempstead, Long Island awarded over $1 billion in contracts to a
politically connected construction company, which had never built
an incinerator, 248 and which had been sanctioned previously for
bid-rigging and price-fixing. 249 Also in New York, the brother of
powerful United States Senator Alphonse D'Amato simultaneously
served as a founding member of a state legislative advisory panel
created to solve New York's garbage problem and counsel to the
large waste management firm, Browning-Ferris.250 Not surprisingly,
he represented Browning-Ferris in negotiations to build and oper-
ate a waste-to-energy plant on Long Island, which the company pro-
jected would generate $1 billion in revenues for twenty years.2 51
Wheelabrator. The partners who invested $51.7 million in the plant expected to
receive revenues of nearly $900 million over 18 years. Id.
243. Id. John Hancock, one of the first financial service companies to invest
in incineration, took equity stakes in projects. Id.
244. Bob Porterfield, Firms at the Top of the Heap, NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 1987, re-
printed in NEWSDAY (reprint 1988), at 41.
245. Firstman, supra note 168, at 4-9.
246. Id.
247. Firstman, supra note 168, at 9.
248. Key Findings, supra note 173, at 4.
249. Id.
250. Firstman, supra note 168, at 9; Thomas J. Maier, Role of a Local Attorney,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 13, 1987, reprinted in The Rush to Burn: America's Garbage Gamble,
NEWSDAY (reprint 1988), at 44-46.
251. Id.
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Former government officials, elected and appointed, readily
enlisted in the incineration boom.252 These individuals went to
work as lawyers and consultants, either on their own or in the em-
ployment of other law practices, consulting firms, or incinerator
builders and operators in the pursuit of establishing incinerators. 253
This type of arrangement was so widespread that Ogden-Martin, a
major builder of incinerators, hired former EPA officials to pro-
mote waste-to-energy as a fiscally and environmentally sound
technology.254
Flow control was not the 'reason waste-to-energy facilities were
built. Most of the explanation lies in the pressure, prodding, and
promotion of incineration by private interests which saw riches in
burning garbage. At the same time, while flow control was not the
reason for the expansion of the waste-to-energy market, it was a key
tool needed to make it happen. Without flow control for the incin-
eration buildup, no one could get rich, and not surprisingly, with a
flow control bailout, no one will be made poor.
The rush to burn was a national experiment that posed the
prospect of trading the pollution of landfills for that of incinerators
while burdening communities and their taxpayers with enormous
long-term financial risks and costs. 255 The promoters of incinera-
tion cultivated an image of problem free technology which burned
garbage without pollution while generating useable electricity.
They painted incinerators as an environmentally sound alternative
to old, overflowing landfills which poisoned groundwater sup-
plies. 256 The selling of a new age of incineration, however, had
skeptics. Financial and environmental problems were predicted by
some in the midst of the incineration buildup of the 1980s. For
example, the head of the New York Public Interest Group, in 1987,
stated his "worst fear" was that the march toward incineration will
252. In New York alone, during the 1980s, examples of this infiltration in-
cluded a New York City sanitation commissioner, state environmental conservation
commissioner, two high ranking EPA officials, and the head of a state commission
on solid waste. Fee & Firstman, supra note 234, at 40. The former lieutenant gov-
ernor of New York, Alfred Delbello, was another case in point. While a Westches-
ter County executive, he approved a contract to build a $180 million incinerator to
be built by one particular incineration firm. Id. Later, as lieutenant governor, he
promoted municipal waste incineration. Id. Then, he left his position to work for
the incineration company which merged with the firm that had built the Westches-
ter County incinerator, became vice-president of the company, and earned nearly
$275,000 a year. Id.
253. Id.
254. Firstman, supra note 168, at 9.
255. Id. at 4.
256. Id. at 4-5.
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lead to "financial disaster."257 Unfortunately, his prediction was
correct.
By the early 1990s, the incineration boom ran out of steam.
The number of new facilities being planned and constructed de-
clined sharply from 202 in 1988, to only 53 in 1993.258 EPA re-
ported that there would now only be a modest growth in the waste
incineration industry during the 1990S.259 Unfortunately, too many
such facilities had already been built, causing communities to be
saddled with massive debts.260 These debts were manageable so
long as flow control existed.261 Without it, however, the incinera-
tors were burning municipal cash rather than trash.262
The financing of waste-to-energy facilities has been structured
so that the public received most of the risks and the private compa-
nies reaped most of the rewards. A common practice was for the
local government to provide the financing, the company to own or
operate it, and the local government to guarantee a certain amount
of trash at a fixed price.2 63 If the market price plunged, and flow
control was eliminated, the municipality would be financially
burned. A combination of factors contribute to what some have
called a "death spiral" leading to even greater declines in wastes
received and more debt for the public. 264 Incinerators, desperate
for cash, might charge a higher fee to local waste collection serv-
ices, and thus to local communities, to cover fixed costs. The
higher tipping fees send local haulers packing and create more
shortfall. Moreover, in an effort to attract additional waste, inciner-
ators often charge considerably less to outsider haulers, begetting
wide disparities in waste charges between local haulers and outside
customers. For example, in Claremont, New Hampshire a waste-to-
energy facility charged $96.50 a ton tipping fee for local trash, but
charged only $40 per ton for outside trash. 265
257. Id. at 5.
258. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-47.
259. Id.
260. Laura Grabrysch, Constitutional Law-Dormant Commerce Clause-Flow Control
Ordinances that Require Disposal of Trash at a Designated Facility Violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 563, 600 n.44 (1995).
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Carbone illustrated such a common practice. See Carbone, 114 S. Ct. at
1680. See also David Strickney, Throwing Away "Flow Control". Effective Solid Waste
Management Succumbs to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 64 U. CIN. L. REv. 283, 283-84
(1995).
264. Bailey, Up in Smoke, supra note 24, at Al.
265. Id.
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Incinerator companies presented and pushed waste-to-energy
plants as a "partnership" with communities. One Broward County,
Florida official said, "one of the partners in this deal is making a
whole lot of money."266 He was speaking about two big incinerators
operating in Broward County which cost $500 million to construct
and which the county must feed at $55 per ton despite the fact that
it can dispose of the waste elsewhere for $42.2 67 This is the crux of
the waste-to-energy problem. The waste-to-energy industry is not
competitive with landfills and is becoming increasingly less so every
day. 268 With flow control, competitiveness was irrelevant; with the
loss of flow control, it is everything. Municipalities collectively
spent billions of dollars to support the building of big incinerators,
but now don't have enough garbage to keep them going.2 69 The
economics of incinerators are "terrible," as the WALL STREET JOUR-
NAL put it, because the cost of disposal is considerably more expen-
sive than at competing landfills.2 70  Incinerators were not
established to be economic in and of themselves. They were
designed to replace a disappearing asset, landfills. Unfortunately,
the landfills did not disappear.2 71
Incinerators need to operate at full capacity in order to be fi-
nancially viable, namely to meet their high debt service costs and
achieve a net cost that is competitive with landfills.2 72 If they can-
not operate near capacity, incinerators cannot meet their debt ser-
vice. Flow control is meant to transform the economics of waste-to-
energy facilities from intrinsically terrible to artificially terrific. As
such, waste-to-energy facilities rely upon flow control, long term
contracts, or a combination of both, to ensure high capacity utiliza-
tion. As a result of flow control, waste-to-energy fees are not limited
by competition and often are used to cover other municipal system
costs.2 73 Waste-to-energy tipping fees supported by flow control are
generally higher than landfill tipping fees.27 4 For example, in New
York, the average incinerator tipping fee is $13 more than the aver-
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at A1-A2.
269. Bailey, Up in Smoke, supra note 24, at A1-A2.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-51.
273. Id.
274. Id.
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age landfill tipping fee.275 In Minnesota, the difference is $34276
and in NewJersey, it is $19.2 77
Measures proposed in Congress to grandfather existing flow
control supported facilities provide a bailout for municipalities
which have established waste-to-energy plants. One source states
that waste-to-energy facilities account for 50%, or $12 billion, of the
total dollar volume of outstanding solid waste bonds. 278 Of the $9
billion in solid waste bonds which Moody's Investors Services has
subjected to rating, two-thirds, or $6 billion, are for waste-to-energy
plants.279 In fact, the head of the Solid Waste Association of North
America believed that the loss of flow control would result in $10
billion of outstanding bonds that finance incinerators to go "belly-
up. "280
The bailout of flow control is not only a bailout for communi-
ties stuck with expensive waste-to-energy plants but also for private
owners, operators, and investors. With the bailout, these interests
cannot lose. The incineration industry is among the leaders urging
congressional legalization of flow control; this was so even before
Carbone.2 1 Prior to Carbone, flow control, along with put-or-pay con-
tracts, virtually eliminated the risks faced by those who operated or
financed ill advised incinerators.282 After Carbone, a congressional
bailout would rescue these interests.283
It is understandable that local governments would want to be
free of the financial difficulties created or compounded by the loss
of flow control to existing waste-to-energy facilities. However, any
measure which compels a large portion of the waste stream to incin-
erators is, quite simply, not necessarily environmentally sound waste
275. Id. at 111-57.
276. Id.
277. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at 111-57.
278. Id.
279. Hogan, supra note 32.
280. Bailey, Up in Smoke, supra note 24, at Al.
281. Broad federal legislation to eliminate judicial challenges to flow control
was urged prior to Carbone by Ogden-Martin, which owns and operates 25 waste-to-
energy facilities that mostly serve municipalities, and has contracts with local gov-
ernments whose flow control directs waste to the Ogden-Martin burners. Commen-
tators Make Concerns Known to Panel on Draft Federal Flow Control Legislation, supra
note 40, at 1924-25; States Urge EPA to Support 'Now Control; Waste Groups Say Issue
Represents Bad Public Policy, supra note 28, at 734-35.
282. Robert C. Cook, Landfill Law Aims at Local Input, 64 J. Mo. B. 336, 336
(1995).
283. Id.
42
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management.284 Flow control, as well as put-or-pay contracts for in-
cinerators, have a "vampire" effect on the waste stream. 28 5 These
measures are meant to steer a fixed percentage of waste toward an
incinerator. In fact, incinerators require no less than their usual
high utilization capacity of waste to meet all fixed costs. Incinera-
tors and landfills are on the bottom of the preferred hierarchy for
waste management. The result is the diversion of a substantial por-
tion of the waste stream to incinerators and away from the more
preferred options of waste reduction, reuse, and recycling.28 6 The
incentive in communities which must operate waste burners at ca-
pacity to meet their debt load is to feed, and feed well, the burning
beast. Every ton of waste fed the incinerator is a ton not subject to
reduction, reuse, and recycling strategies.
It should be no surprise that flow control deprives some waste
management options and feeds others, since flow control is ex-
pressly meant to monopolize the waste stream for activities it finan-
cially guarantees, like incinerators. The tendency of flow control to
disadvantage the environmentally preferred options of reduction,
reuse, and recycling is a major reason national environmental orga-
nizations oppose flow control.2 87 Incinerators have long been criti-
cized as expensive and unreliable.288 They have been promised as
an alternative to replace old landfills that endanger water supplies;
however, they have raised concerns that one kind of pollution has
been substituted for another.28 9 Instead of direct land and water
pollution, incinerators contribute to air pollution and generate
huge quantities of toxic ash.2 90
VIII. ALTERNATIVES TO FLOW CONTROL
Flow control is not required to establish waste management fa-
cilities. They were built without the benefit of flow control prior to
284. See id. at 340. Cook pointed out that incineration has raised issues of
safety and pollution, concerns that have irritated neighbors of existing and pro-
posed facilities, and spawned litigation. Id.
285. Wolf, supra note 10, at 535-36.
286. Id. at 534-35.
287. Environmentalists generally take a dim view of incinerators not only be-
cause they divert waste from alternatives like recycling, but also because of con-
cerns over air pollution. Holusha, supra note 55.
288. Firstman, supra note 168, at 5.
289. Id.
290. Id. at 6. See generally NEW YORK PUBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, INC.,
No TIME TO WASTE: STARTING WASTE REDUCTION, RECYCLING AND REUSE PROGRAMS
TO STOP INCINERATION AND LANDFILLING (1989).
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Carbone, and will continue to be built without flow control. 29' Since
1988, for example, the waste management firm, Browning-Ferris In-
dustries, has built over fourteen composting facilities and eighty re-
cycling facilities all around the nation without public support.292
Alternatives to flow control existed prior to Carbone, and the
same alternatives exist today. Consequently, flow control is both
unnecessary and expendable.2 93 Most of these alternatives have
been tried in one form or another in real places; they are not
merely theoretical proposals. Minnesota is a good example of a
state where several approaches have been used to steer wastes to
preferred waste management facilities and away from those consid-
ered environmentally inferior.294 All the alternatives, admittedly,
have downsides and pose difficulties similar to flow control. There
is no single perfect solution for state and local governments to steer
waste to desirable facilities in the most economical, environmental,
and constitutional manner.
A. Financial Options
Alternatives to flow control generally fall into two categories;
financial and organizational. 295 A direct financial alternative is
monetary assistance by state and local governments to help main-
tain lower tipping fees. In 1993, for instance, the Minnesota legisla-
ture gave $1.5 million to two solid waste facilities to subsidize their
operations. 296
Local governments and cities, as another alternative, may im-
pose surcharges on waste disposed of in landfills, with or without a
higher surcharge on waste generated outside the area.297 City and
county licensing fees for waste collection firms, furthermore, can be
used to fund facilities, either in addition to, or in lieu of, tipping
fees. 298 Minnesota, for example, has mandated landfill surcharges
291. It is important to note that facilities built without flow control are subject
to the same environmental standards as those built with it.
292. Flow Control Hearings, supra note 27, at 42.
293. See Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Southeast Alabama Solid Waste Disposal Au-
thority, 814 F. Supp. 1566, 1581 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (acknowledging that there exist
alternatives to flow control regulations).
294. These alternatives are discussed in Taylor, supra note 62, at 15-16.
295. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at ES-12 to ES-13, 111-80 to 111-83.
296. Taylor, supra note 62, at 15.
297. Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 114 S. Ct.
1345 (1994) (invalidating as violation of Commerce Clause Oregon's imposition of
higher fee for in-state disposal of solid waste generated out of state than for solid
waste generated in state).
298. Taylor, supra note 62, at 16.
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in order to internalize more of the cost of landfilling by the landfills
themselves. Furthermore, Minnesota requires waste collectors to
be licensed by the jurisdiction in which they operate.2 99 We have
long accepted the notion that licensing can be accompanied by
fees. This license fee can be set at a level that would cover the basic
costs for operating facilities.
Taxing the waste stream in communities through landfill
surcharges or licensing fees is one of the most potent alternatives to
flow control. 300 Another form of waste taxing user fees levied on
waste generators or private sector providers, and includes uniform
user fees, unit-based pricing, and market-based tipping fees.30' In
addition, general taxes like property taxes can support waste man-
agement facilities and operations. Some communities with expen-
sive waste-to-energy plants, but without flow control, have resorted
to "economic flow control."302 With economic flow control, com-
munities set the disposal fees for the incinerator low enough to at-
tract garbage and then handle the rest of the costs in the tax
base.30 3 Whether Congress grandfathers formal flow control or
not, this approach may become more frequently used by communi-
ties to establish new facilities.
Economists have long recommended a variety of pollution and
waste stream taxes to pay for good waste facilities, discourage waste
generation, and raise revenues for other public purposes. These
taxes, essentially, are meant to internalize the externalities of pro-
duction and consumption which generate waste in our society.
3 0 4
They include single-item taxes, general litter taxes, and disposal
taxes.305 Single item taxes are placed on individual types or classes
of products, such as tires, bottles, car batteries, newspapers, appli-
ances and the like.30 6 General litter taxes are broader in nature
and are applied to larger categories of consumer products that cre-
ate litter or other forms of solid waste. Disposal taxes are fees col-
299. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.553 (West 1995 & Supp. 1996).
300. Flow control is, in fact, essentially a hidden tax concealed in waste dispo-
sal charges anyway.
301. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at ES-12, 111-81 to 111-82.
302. Bailey, Up in Smoke, supra note 24, at Al; EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at I-
5 n.11.
303. Bailey, Up in Smoke, supra note 24, at Al.
304. ROBERT REPETTO, ET At.., WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, GREEN FEES: How
A TAX SHIrT CAN WORK FOR THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE ECONOMY (1992).
305. MATHEW MONTAVON & PAUL SHINN, GOVERNMENT FINANCE RESEARCH
CENTER OF THE GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, TAXING THE SOLID
WASTE STREAM FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 1, 12, 28, 32 (1990).
306. Id.
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lected at landfills or incinerators on the weight or volume of trash
disposed.30 7 These taxes include the surcharge previously men-
tioned.308 The revenue raising, facility building,, and waste reduc-
ing possibilities of taxing the waste stream are virtually untapped
but hold great promise.30 9
Financially, communities can employ subsidies, surcharges,
and taxes to replace the economic boost provided by flow control.
They can also, furthermore, turn to organizational options inde-
pendently or in connection with financial alternatives.
B. Organizational Options
Organizational alternatives to flow control include: (1) munici-
pal ownership and operation of waste collection systems that deliver
the wastes and recyclables to selected facilities; (2) utilization of the
private sector, such as hiring contractors to perform collection serv-
ices, or awarding franchises for collection and hauling services
within given collection districts with designated waste facilities cho-
sen by the communities; and (3) creation of special purpose dis-
tricts or utilities to manage municipal solid waste collection and
delivery to designated facilities.310 In addition, higher standards for
landfills and waste-to-energy facilities could divert waste to selected
methods of waste management. Indeed, steady improvement in
regulatory standards has been the trend for state and federal gov-
ernments. 3 11 As standards progressively rise, they will force landfills
to upgrade or close, having the effect of diverting waste to some of
the state of the art waste management facilities which in the past
were supported by flow control.
Minnesota also has experience with several of these organiza-
tional options. Minnesota counties have entered into contracts
with private haulers and others to assure sufficient waste streams for
facilities.31 2 Although this approach is limited when there are
cheaper alternative facilities to receive the waste, long-term security
regarding both a place and price for depositing waste can be very
attractive to many waste haulers.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. MONTAVON & SHINN, supra note 305, at 1, 12, 28, 32.
310. EPA REPORT, supra note 92, at ES-11, 111-80 to 111-81.
311. Taylor, supra note 62, at 15-16.
312. See, e.g., Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, 985 F.2d 1381, 1383-87
(8th Cir. 1993).
46
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 7, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol7/iss2/2
BURNING BEAST
Some communities in Minnesota have seen the local govern-
ment directly control collection and disposal of waste, an option
that was more widely used in the past, but is no longer broadly prac-
ticed in Minnesota or any other state.313 Nevertheless, a local gov-
ernment has a variety of measures it can use to organize collection,
including government collection, contracting with or without com-
petitive bidding, or exclusive franchising or negotiating with a con-
sortium of haulers to establish service areas and prices.31 4 A
contract created under organized collection could mandate that
waste be delivered to a specific facility. This may or may not escape
the fate of flow control, but where contracts are voluntarily entered
into by waste haulers, it likely would not be challenged as a viola-
tion of the Commerce Clause.315 While it is true that government
control of waste disposal may be more intrusive than flow control,
treating waste like a public utility will not subject it to the same
Commerce Clause challenge that the town of Clarkstown faced in
Carbone.
IX. CONCLUSION
Flow control was the easy way to finance and build waste facili-
ties that would have been otherwise difficult to finance and build.
Flow control offered a quick fix that enabled state and local govern-
ments to avoid more difficult choices for both waste management
strategies and facilities. As a result, flow control skewed waste man-
agement choices to big and enormously expensive facilities.
Major public works projects in American communities typically
are financed by general obligation bonds backed by property taxes,
which are easy to administer and are perhaps the most direct means
to finance waste facilities. Property tax increases, however, are po-
litically unpopular. Likewise, most other kinds of fees and taxes
invoke the same resistance. On the contrary, we live in an era
where tax hikes are anathema, and property tax relief is de rigueur.
Hence, the motivation for adoption of flow control was to escape
the dreaded property tax increase, but still finance necessary waste
facilities, including the big controversial incinerators.
313. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115A.21(1) (a) (West 1995).
314. Organized collection of solid waste is authorized by Minnesota's waste
management legislation and is, or can be, in other states.
315. A local government, however, has to see that the measures it uses do not
constitute municipal regulation of the waste market. If the measures are deemed
to constitute regulation, the measures are subject to scrutiny under the Commerce
Clause. See SSC Corp. v. Smithtown, 66 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 1995).
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Looking back, it is very likely that if decision-makers and the
public were forced to seriously consider using property taxes to sup-
port waste management, they would have balked at financing the
large-scale, expensive facilities which went hand-in-hand with flow
control. Many incinerators would not have been built, and those
that were would have been financed primarily with general obliga-
tion bonds, which are repaid from taxes, rather than revenue
bonds, which rely upon tipping fees.3 16 Flow control, however, was
adopted in some communities, and huge incinerators were built
without tax support. If flow control is not restored to those facilities
it once supported, many communities will have to turn to property
taxes to repay their indebtedness; ironic, isn't it?
Without flow control, it would not be nearly as easy to build
large, capital intensive facilities. Financing waste facilities through
taxes rather than flow control would tend to make decisions to
build waste management facilities more economically prudent. Fis-
cal restraint would be a major guiding principle. Federal, state, and
local governments might have been more receptive to the more en-
vironmentally sound, more preferable strategies at the top of the
waste management hierarchy, relying less on capital intensive facili-
ties like incinerators on the bottom of the hierarchy, and turned to
meaningful regulation to achieve source reduction, reuse, and in-
tensive recycling.
Since 1986, Germany has embarked on a serious regulatory ef-
fort to reduce excess product packaging with a novel system called
the Green Dot program.3 17 The German Green Dot system allows
consumers to leave excess packaging from various consumables at
the stores where the products are purchased. German industry, act-
ing through a consortium of 600 retailers, packagers, and raw
materials suppliers, in turn, must collect the product packaging
from retailers and is responsible for recycling it. Pursuant to the
Green Dot system, German industry must reduce 64% to 72% of
various packaging by 1995.318 Aside from the legislated quotas the
industry must satisfy, requiring manufacturers to be responsible for
316. Many communities would have rejected the building of the waste-to-en-
ergy facilities through the property tax base. At the very least, less costly incinera-
tors might have been constructed. One needs only to look at past and present
battles over proposed construction of other important public facilities, such as
schools.
317. Putting Responsibility on Indusy, BioCyciE, June 1993, 60-63. See also
Steven P. Reynolds, The German Recycling Experiment and Its Lessons for United States
Policy, 6 Viui-. ENvrt. LJ. 43, 51 n.45 (1995).
318. Putting Responsibility on Industry, BIoCYcLE, June 1993, at 60-63.
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the waste they produce has the effect of encouraging them to re-
duce the amount of packaging to avoid the cost of recycling.
The Green Dot program, sweeping the rest of Europe, is sym-
bolized by the disappearance of the toothpaste box - a vivid exam-
ple of source reduction. 31 9 No longer would you find a box
containing a tube of toothpaste on store shelves in Germany. In
the United States, both federal and state government have, for the
most part, refused to seriously undertake regulation for source re-
duction, reuse, and intensive recycling. European nations, particu-
larly Germany, are way ahead in this area. It is rather ironic that we
are ignoring the German source reduction and recycling system
now, as it was German incinerator technology that we copied in the
"rush to burn" 1980s.32 0
We did not do ourselves any favors when we adopted flow con-
trol. We only helped set back American waste management. By
building facilities like incinerators which perpetuate the national
culture of consumption, flow control did not challenge the all-con-
suming lifestyle of the throw-away society we created, and necessi-
tated a national waste management system dominated by
disposal. 321 Flow control, furthermore, gave the appearance that
the public was not paying for waste facilities; but of course now we
know that it is paying a great deal. A congressional bailout of flow
control does not address the problems flow control created, or at
least contributed to, and is ultimately another easy way out. We
may not be doing ourselves a favor now by bailing out communities
using flow control - we may just be rewarding foolish choices.
Congress should consider this the next time it considers bailout leg-
islation, as it surely will.
319. Id.
320. Peracchio, supra note 185, at 30.
321. Irene Virag, The All Consuming Lifestyle, America's Routines are Rooted in the
Psychology of a Disposable Society -A National Culture of Consumption, NEWSDAY, Dec. 13,
1987, reprinted in, The Rush to Burn: America's Garbage Gamble, NEWSDAY (reprint
1988). at 11.
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